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Abstract
This thesis analyzes characteristics of the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) in the time period
1961-1989. Furthermore, this thesis extends the literature concerning the research on the
P/B anomaly in the Norwegian stock market by investigating the relationship between
the P/B ratio and future realized stock returns. The anomaly is heavily researched in
other markets. Similar studies have also been conducted for the OSE after 1980. We
extend the research of the anomaly with additional 19 prior years. The analyses are
based on a self-assembled data set, supplemented with existing market values and stock
prices.
Considering the characteristics of the OSE, both the market value and invested capital
grew rapidly throughout the observed period. Key indicators, like the debt ratio, return
on equity, price-book and price-earnings, have also been analyzed, and we find that the
ratios historically reflect market factors and events.
In our analysis, we find a significant link between the contemporary P/B and the future
long-term stock return. However, when we control for company size (market value), risk
(debt ratio), profitability (ROE) and a 5-year lag of the long-term return, the significance
diminishes. Further, we identify that the P/B effect can be explained by differences in firm
size (the size effect). The similar relationship is researched through a portfolio analysis,
where we compare the future return of a portfolio consisting of low P/B firms and the
future return of a portfolio consisting of high P/B firms. Despite the equally-weighted low
P/B portfolio providing a significantly higher future return, the superior gain disappears
when comparing the future return of the value-weighted portfolios. These results provide
further support for the size effect.
i
Preface
This thesis is a part of a greater project initiated by NHH Børsdatabasen. In order to
obtain a deeper knowledge about the history of OSE, it has been desirable to digitalize and
categorize financial statement information of listed companies at OSE and complement
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1. Introduction
1.1. Purpose and Motivation
In collaboration with NHH Børsdatabasen, this master thesis aims to provide elaborate
insights of the characteristics of the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) in the time period 1961-
1989. There is little research on OSE characteristics in the time period, as data on
company’s financial statements have not been fully digitalized1. The lack of available
information has motivated us to assemble a data set of accounting information for a sig-
nificant share of the companies listed at OSE2. Collecting the financial statements has
been an extensive and time-consuming process, as the majority of the balance sheet items
and income statements have manually been collected from handbooks, sorted and con-
verted into digital form. We believe that our final data set will be a valuable contribution
to the existing information and research on the OSE, as well as allowing for longer-term
analyses of the tendencies and mechanisms affecting the Norwegian stock market. The
collected financial data has been supplemented with existing market values and stock
returns, and thus comprise a comprehensive database that can provide deeper insights
about the OSE for our selected time period.
Previous research concerning the characteristics of OSE has primarily been based on data
from 1980 and onwards3. As we provide data for an additional 19 years back in time,
the analyses presented in this thesis aim to link market- and financial information to the
historical context prior to 1980. In addition to presenting fundamental characteristics of
the OSE for the period 1961-1989, this thesis further seeks to investigate the relationship
between the price-book (P/B) ratio and future realized stock returns. The connection
between these measures is heavily researched for other stock markets4. Similar analyses
have been performed of the OSE for different time intervals, however, these analyses
1Financial information has been available for a share of our included companies for the time period
1980-89.
2Approximately 60 % of the total market value of OSE in 1961-1989 are categorized each year. Figure
4.1 presents an overview of the share of total market value categorized each year.
3See for instance Næs et al. (2008) and Hillestad (2007).
4Prior research papers are presented in section 1.2.
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focus on time intervals after 19805. The P/B analyses are based on two main hypotheses,
presented in the next subsection.
1.2. Main Hypotheses
The main analyses presented in this paper consist of two approaches, both examining
the relationship between the P/B and future stock returns. First, we aim to study
the relationship between P/B and future long-term stock returns both on an aggregate
(market) and firm level. The first approach is based on the following hypothesis:
i) A low (high) P/B ratio is associated with a high (low) future long-term return.
Previous research have addressed the relationship between the P/B value and the future
stock return, both on the aggregate and firm level, and we initially expect a low P/B
value to be correlated with positive future stock returns. The intertemporal relationship
between the two economic variables is typically explained by temporary mispricing and/or
risk compensation, see for instance Fama and French (1992), Chen and Zhang (1998),
Lakonishok et al. (1994) and Skinner and Sloan (2002).
Fama and French (1992) showed that the P/B ratio of individual stocks may explain
cross-sectional variation in future stock returns. The empirical findings triggered the
interest of other researchers, elaborating on the results both on the firm level and the
aggregate level. Among them, Kothari and Shanken (1997) found the aggregate P/B to
be a good predictive indicator of the future market returns, which provides an additional
basis for our first hypothesis.
Second, we wish to further analyze the relationship of interest through a portfolio-based
approach, where portfolios consisting of low P/B firms are constructed and compared to
portfolios of high P/B firms. The second approach is based on the following hypothesis:
ii) Portfolios dominated by low P/B firms yield a higher mean return than portfolios
dominated by high P/B firms.
Initially, we expect that the low P/B portfolio will yield a higher future mean return
than the high P/B portfolio. Previous empirical studies find equivalent results for other
5See for instance Næs et al. (2008) and Ådland and Hansen (2012).
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countries (and for OSE after 1980) both during the period we investigate and other time
periods (see for instance Rosenberg et al. (1985), Fama and French (1992), Lakonishok
et al. (1994) and Piotroski (2000)). Our analysis will address whether the relationship
also applies for OSE when considering 1961-1989.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 gives a brief overview of
the historical background of OSE in our selected time period whereas chapter 3 includes
a literature review and relevant theory. Chapter 4 provides a walkthrough of the data
assembling process. Further, chapter 5 presents characteristics of OSE from 1961 to 1989.
Next, we describe the methodological approach applied to capture the relation between
the P/B ratio and the future stock return in addition to presenting and discussing the
empirical results of the analysis. Finally, chapter 7 provides some suggestions to further
research and chapter 8 contains the conclusion of the thesis.
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2. Historical Background
Post Second World War, social democracy had its victory in Norway. Some would prob-
ably perceive OSE as an “excess” institution in a system where the state should play the
most central role for capital distribution and facilitator for the foundation of new industry
(Bredal, 1994). Private actors faced political regulations, and the activity at OSE was
low (Sejersted, 2009). Companies mainly issued debt, despite credit being regulated. The
low interest rate policy during the postwar period also made debt favorable (The History
of Oslo Børs). We find that the debt ratio for companies at OSE increased from 58 %
in 1961 to 71 % in 19821. Knutsen (1994) also reports that the level of debt increases
in this time period. The rising debt ratio was not unique for Norway; Knutsen (1994)
mentions that Japan, Germany and France also had high debt ratios. For the U.S and
Great Britain, on the other hand, the debt ratio remained stable around 50 %.
When the oil field Ekofisk was discovered and declared to be a commercial exploitable
field in 1969, the oil adventure started for Norway. The optimism also affected the OSE
(The History of Oslo Børs). As over-subscribed shares were distributed proportionally,
investors applied for shares in the name of their aunts, dogs and cats in order to get a
sizeable stake in companies that were believed to bring substantial future profit. In 1970,
the market index increased by 49.9 % and the stock return hits another peak of 97.6 % in
19732. However, in 1974, the optimism turned to pessimism. The world economy expe-
rienced a substantial recession, much due to the oil price increase introduced by OPEC
in 1973, which also negatively affected the price of other goods. The shipping sector
struggled. The oil adventure ended abruptly as the Norwegian government announced
that stricter licensing terms would be introduced and revenues from oil extraction would
be heavily taxed. The trading activity at the OSE was modest for the rest of the 1970s.
The share turnover leveled 3.7 billion in 1970 and had dropped to 3.5 billion in 1981
(Cameron, 1994, p. 149).
At the beginning of the 1980s, only the most hopeful and optimistic believed the position
1The numbers are based on equally-weighted averages, see tables 9.25-9.27 in appendix. The com-
putation of the debt ratio will be elaborated later in this paper.
2The stock returns are based on a value-weighted average, see table 9.13 and 9.14 in appendix.
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of OSE would change. The deputy chairman in the Norwegian Labor Party, Einar Førde,
expressed ”Why bring oats to a dying horse” to describe the role of OSE in the beginning
of the 1980s (Bredal, 1994, p. 191). OSE was considered to be insignificant and of low
importance. The Norwegian economy reached a low point in 1982 and the market index
decreased by 19.1 %3. However, changes were about to come. 1983 marks a turning point
of OSE’s role as a capital distributor. The stock trading activity skyrocketed, caused by
both private, foreign and corporate investors. The market index increased by 66 %4,
and the trading volume on a typical day in 1983 reached the level of an entire week of
trading in 1982 (Kigen, 1994). The revival of the OSE facilitated an increased level of
acquisitions, stock issues and other forms of equity inflows, improving the capital base
of the listed companies (Cameron, 1994). The growth in real market value also shows
a remarkable shift. For our selected companies, real market value grew by 286 % from
1982 to 1989. The modernization of the OSE continued in 1988, when the first electronic
trading system was implemented (The History of Oslo Børs).
Entering the 1980s, political changes occurred in Norway (Sejersted, 2013). The so-
cial–democratic political direction that had been successful in the post Second World
War period, was by many thought to be outdated. The society experienced a change in
values from equality and regulation towards individualism and privatization. In 1981,
the Conservative Party, led by K̊are Willoch, won the election. One of the modifications
the new political path lead to was the deregulation of the credit market at the end of
1983 (Lie, 2012). The Government continued to execute the low interest rate policy and
further decreased the rate in 1984. The growth in loans was substantial. In addition,
share savings started to provide tax deductions in 1983, making stock trading more at-
tractive. As investments in shares became a more favorable way of saving, the increased
purchasing power positively affected the demand for stocks (NRK TV, 2013). The easing
of political regulations can also be viewed as one reason why the activity at OSE started
to increase in the 1980s (The History of Oslo Børs).
In line with the increasing debt level, Norwegian consumption also grew substantially.
3See table 9.15 in Appendix.
4See table 9.15 in Appendix.
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The years after 1983 represent the “Yuppie” period in Norway, where goods were supposed
to be luxurious, expensive and elegant (NRK TV, 2013). The “Yuppies” represented
young, ambitious and professional individuals that wanted to do business, become wealthy
and consume at a high level. As more debt was issued, the banks experienced a rapid
increase in revenues, which led to more issuance of debt. Few feared the troubles with
repaying debt if the market conditions changed.
On October 19, 1987, several stock markets around the world collapsed. The OSE was
also affected, and the market index fell by 25 % from October 16th to October 20th
(Kigen, 1994, p. 130). The crash in the stock market led to considerable losses for several
short-term investors. The atmosphere was especially critical as a significant amount of
stock investments were facilitated with borrowed money. In Norway, the stock market
turbulence also coincided with an economic decline. In 1986, the Norwegian oil revenues
were strongly reduced as the oil price dropped (Cappelen et al., 2014). Also, The Nor-
wegian Labor Party led by Gro Harlem Brundtland regained the power. In order to ease
the credit expansion, the interest rate was hiked (Sejersted, 2013). The banks suffered
great losses as a substantial amount of debt was issued to the oil industry and private
households, where many were unable to pay interest and deductions (NRK TV, 2013).
6
3. Literature Review
In the early 1970’s, a new consensus emerged among economists, led by Fama and Malkiel
(1970), suggesting that stock prices could be well approximated by a random walk process.
A random walk is a stochastic process where each component is independent from each
other, indicating that changes in stock returns are unpredictable. As a result of the
random walk theory of asset prices, Samuelson (1965) introduced (a prominent version
of) the Efficient Market Hypothesis, later formalized by Fama and Malkiel (1970). The
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) states that the market, in sum, will rationally adapt
to the information available in the market. Stock prices will thus reflect all available
information at all times. Fama defined three forms of the EMH (weak, semi-strong
and strong1), where the semi-strong form of efficiency states that all publicly available
information is already reflected in the market prices. Thus, according to the EMH,
abnormal future stock returns cannot be obtained by exploiting information available
today, as the prices on traded assets should already reflect the content of this information.
A significant amount of empirical studies show a high correlation between future returns
and several different factors observable today, both on the aggregate level and on firm
level. At the aggregate level, Fama and French (1992) and Kothari and Shanken (1997)
show that the time-variation in expected returns can be predicted by interest rates, the
yield spread, (aggregate) dividend yield and (aggregate) P/B ratios. In addition, Fama
and French (1992) concluded that both firm size and P/B ratios can explain a significant
part of the cross-sectional variation in returns on firm level. Rosenberg et al. (1985)
documented an equivalent effect, controlling for market beta and size according to the
Fama and French three-factor model2 (Fama and French, 1992).
Potential explanations for the relationship between the P/B ratio and future stock returns
is also addressed. Fama and French (1992) and Chen and Zhang (1998) claim that the
subsequent excess return associated with low P/B companies represents the demanded
1The weak form suggests that future stock prices can not be predicted by considering historical prices.
The strong form assumes that today’s stock price consist of all available information, both private and
public.
2The three-factor model includes size risk and value risk to explain differences in diversified portfolios,
as an expansion to CAPM that only accounts for market (beta) risk.
7
risk compensation related to relative financial distress3. When a firm is risky, the investor
typically demands a risk premium to hold the stock. This is in line with the EMH as this
risk initially is priced correctly in the market.
Following Miller and Modigliani (1961), a theoretical approach to the correct P/B value
can be derived. Miller and Modigliani established through the investment opportunity
approach that the worth of a corporation’s equity (P0) can be explained by three factors;
the required rate of return to shareholders (k), the current earnings the firm generates
based on their prior investments (E0) and the excess return of the firms future investments





+ PV GO (3.1)
If both sides in equation 3.1 is divided by B0 (current book value of equity), the P/B










In equation (3.2), the return on equity (ROE) equals E0 /B0. The P/B ratio equals 1
if the return on equity equals the shareholders yield. The return the company generates
on its current investments is thus the same as the compensation the investors require. If
the return of equity is higher (lower) than the investors required rate of return, the P/B
ratio is expected to be above 1 (below 1). A high P relative to B may also be justified
if a firm is expected to have a high future growth rate (PV GO). A positive PV GO is
achieved if a company’s future investments yield a higher return than the shareholders
required rate of return.
Modigliani and Miller’s approach represents a theoretical proposition to the correct stock
price and P/B value. However, the actual P/B ratio might differ from theory due to
the occurrence of temporary mispricing. This approach is, in contrast to the risk com-
pensation theory, not in line with EMH. Lakonishok et al. (1994) argue that firms with
3When a firm is in financial distress, the market often anticipates future losses (or even worse;
bankruptcy), driving down the market value of equity and the P/B ratio (Campbell et al., 2008). Hence,
the connection between low P/B firms and distress risk can be justified.
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low P/B ratios represent “neglected stocks” where poor prior performance has resulted
in overly pessimistic expectations about the future performance. This pessimism later
unravels, in terms of positive earnings and returns in future periods. This is in line with
a value-investing strategy, where investors hold stocks perceived as undervalued due to
transitory circumstances in the market.
Considering prior research of the OSE, several papers have examined potential factors
that affect future stock returns and whether value investing strategies have provided an
excess (risk adjusted) return. Næs et al. (2008) investigate how the CAPM-anomalies
size, book value, momentum and liquidity might affect the stock return pattern for OSE
in 1980-2006. They find evidence that the stock return at OSE can be explained by the
market index, size and liquidity. However, they fail to provide similar evidence for the
P/B’s effect on future returns, indicating that this ratio do not systematically affect the
stock return at OSE4. Conversely, Egeberg and Enge (2009) and Rettedal (2012) examine
the OSE for the periods 1998-2009 and 1994-2011 respectively, and report support for
a significantly higher monthly return (unadjusted for risk) for companies with relatively
low P/B values. Furthermore, Ådland and Hansen (2012) study the time interval 1983-
2010 and found that stocks with low P/B and low P/E ratios also earn a higher stock
return. However, when comparing with the MSCI Norway Index, the findings were not
significant for the P/B multiple. As prior research only assesses the time after 1980, the
main focus of our thesis will be on characteristics of OSE for the years 1961-1979.
4Næs et al. (2008) test the P/B relationship by constructing ten portfolios where portfolio 1(10)
consist of 10 % of the companies with highest (lowest) P/B value. When examining the return difference
between portfolio 1 and 10, they only find a significant return difference for the subperiod 1980-1989,
not for the periods 1990-1999 and 2000-2006.
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4. Data Description
The following section describes our data sources, while section 4.2 details how we put
together the final data set. We will especially outline how the debt and equity items
from the balance sheets have been categorized and how the adjusted profit is computed
for each individual company. Section 4.3 presents the procedures for the data selection
process before a discussion of the potential weaknesses regarding the data assembling
process is included in section 4.4.
4.1. Data Sources
The data set includes accounting- and market information for a selection of listed com-
panies at OSE in 1961-1989. Figure 4.1 displays how many percent of the total market
value of listed companies included in our final data set. The computation of market share
is based on the total market value of all listed companies retrieved from Buer (2013). The
original data set might have undervalued the market value of a few companies, as some
capital adjustments were omitted. We have completed the market value adjustments for
the companies included in our data set. However, as there may be wrongly adjusted mar-
ket values of the companies not included in our analysis, the share of market value shown
in 4.1 may be overestimated. Buer (2013) uses numbers retrieved from OSE Information
after 1980, where market values initially should be adjusted for all capital events. This
may partly explain the decrease of our categorized share after 1980.
Figure 4.1 – Share of the total market value of the OSE included in the final data set.
We consider the share of included companies as sufficient to be a representative selection
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of the full Stock Exchange. An excerpt of the data set is included in the appendix (table
9.13-9.36). The data set includes companies from the following sectors: Bank, insurance,
whale, industry and shipping. As the whale sector merges with the shipping sector in
1969 (Kigen, 1994, p. 116), we treat the whale companies as shipping companies from
the beginning of our time period. To avoid survivorship bias, the data set also includes
companies that only have available data for a specific part of the time period in question.
4.1.1 Financial Statements
We use two sources, Kierulf’s Handbooks and the database DataStream (DS), to retrieve
information regarding the financial statements. For the time period 1961-1980, data
on the companies’ balance sheet is entirely based on accounting numbers from Kierulf’s
Handbooks. The handbooks were published by the company Carl Kierulf & Co A/S from
1900 and was viewed as a vital source for reliable information regarding the companies
listed at OSE (The History of Oslo Børs). The books have been an indispensable source
when collecting the necessary data used in this thesis, as they include detailed informa-
tion about a company’s share capital, balance sheet and income statement. For the years
1981-1989, balance sheets were either collected from DataStream or from the handbooks.
For several companies, DataStream was not able to provide us with the necessary bal-
ance sheet items. For these companies, the accounting numbers were retrieved from the
handbooks. Data required for computing adjusted profit were fully collected from the
handbooks for all years.
4.1.2 Market Data
Data regarding stock returns, market values and shares issued are initially obtained from
a data set Buer (2013) collected and developed based on daily price reports from OSE
and data retrieved from Oslo Stock Exchange Information. For a few observations, the
data set was incomplete and we use data collected from Kierulf’s handbooks to fill in
the missing values. When companies had deviating accounting periods, the stock price
on the true closing date has been used instead of the 31st of December. Buer (2013)
mentions that if a stock was missing a listing price at year-end, the price on the closest
day of trading was recorded.
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4.2. Data Assembling
To analyze the features of the OSE in our period of interest, we have assembled a data set
linking accounting numbers, market data and key indicators for all included companies
over time. To obtain this information, a time-consuming categorization and adjustment
of the accounting numbers have been necessary. In the following subsections we will
elaborate this process.
4.2.1 Categorization of the Balance Sheet
The categorization of the debt and equity side of the balance sheet has been employed
for all companies in our final data set. The balance sheet items have been separated
into i) share capital, ii) taxed equity, iii) untaxed equity, v) interest bearing debt, vi)
non-interest bearing debt and vi) minority interest. We have used this classification for
observing changes in the financial structure throughout the selected time period, both on
the aggregate and firm level. The categorization is based on accounting theory. In some
cases, the position in the balance sheet has been used to decide category, as the items
lacked sufficient information to base the division solely on the determined method1. Our
main goal has been to attain a categorization that is consistent over time and across firms
for the entire data sample, making the changes in financial structure comparable both
between companies and across time. In the following paragraphs, a brief description of
each category is presented.
i) Share capital
Both Kierulf’s Handbooks and DataStream provide the relevant information regarding
the share capital, making the classification of items in this category straight-forward
without much uncertainty. In some cases, a company has issued both A- and B-shares.
B-shares typically have fewer voting rights as compared to A-shares (Br̊athen, 2000).
However, B-shares are generally more liquid as A-shares often are held by the founders
of the corporation instead of being traded more frequently in the market. Both A- and
B-shares are categorized as share capital. Some companies have issued both ordinary
1If an item is placed at the end of the income statement, the position implies that the item is a
provision that needs to be adjusted for.
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shares and preference shares. Preference shares have the first right to dividends, but the
voting rights are limited (Hobson, 2012, p. 7). As the share class is not graded and priced
at OSE, only ordinary shares are categorized as share capital.
ii) Taxed Equity
In this category, all fully taxed equity posts are included. It follows that the funds
categorized as taxed equity can be used without causing a tax effect. Some taxed equity
items have been challenging to identify. For example, dividend provisions may qualify
as taxed equity if the provision is interpreted as retained earnings. However, dividend
provisions may also be defined as non-interest bearing debt as the provision can be seen
as a debt the company has to its stakeholders. To be able to fully determine the correct
category, a detailed analysis of the individual firms and how they handle their balance
sheet items is required, which is way beyond the scope of this thesis. Hence, to be
consistent, we choose to classify dividend provisions as taxed equity for all companies.
iii) Untaxed Equity
In contrast to taxed equity, untaxed equity are provisions that consist of both equity
and a potential tax component. Prior to the tax reform in Norway in 1991-1992, the
accounting law and tax regulations allowed parts of the taxation to be postponed by
allocating a share of the profit to funds aimed at covering future expenses (Gabrielsen,
1992). Due to these regulations, balance sheet items with these features were common in
our time period of interest. Thus, the category “untaxed equity” is essential to identify
in order to separate equity from debt. The tax rate for corporations fluctuated around
50 % in Norway prior to the tax reform in 1991-1992. The effective tax rate may have
been somewhat lower due to a tax system opening for tax credit and tax deduction
opportunities. Regardless, we have chosen to recognize 50 % of the untaxed equity as
equity and the remaining half as non-interest bearing debt, as this assumption makes the
categorization consistent over time. Consequently, the chosen level may create biases in
the identified equity share in years with deviating tax rates.
iv) Interest Bearing Debt
Interest bearing debt is liabilities that require interest payments. It is important to dis-
tinguish between debt with and without interest in our analysis. To be able to separate
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interest-bearing debt from non-interest bearing debt, we have to invoke a couple assump-
tions, as the information retrieved from the balance sheets was not always sufficient to
decide with certainty whether a debt item carried interest or not. For example, we have
assumed that debt identified as long-term debt is consistently classified as interest bearing
debt.
v) Non-Interest Bearing Debt
Non-interest bearing debt is liabilities without interest payments. As with the interest-
bearing debt, some assumptions regarding the categorization has been necessary. Short-
term liabilities rarely carries interest (except for bank debt). Consequently, we have
classified short-term debt as non-interest bearing debt if it is unclear whether the liability
item carries interest or not. Also, provisions for pension funds may be justified as either
taxed equity or non-interest bearing debt. We define these provisions as a periodical
cost, rather than a provision of retained earnings. Thus, it seems accurate to classify the
item as non-interest bearing debt. Furthermore, for several companies, the balance sheet
includes debt items that are debt to subsidiaries or group companies. Here, the items
have mainly been classified as non-interest bearing debt.
vi) Minority Interests
Minority interest is a balance sheet item where another company owns a significant por-
tion, but less than 50 %, of the outstanding shares in the company. Although the item is
rarely observed in our company’s balance sheets, we still found it appropriate to separate
it in an individual category. The values constituted a consistently low fraction of the
total asset value.
4.2.2 Computation of Adjusted Profit
A time-consuming part of our data preparation process has been to compute adjusted
profit for the companies included in the final data set. As mentioned earlier, the data
required to accomplish the adjustment is fully based on Kierulf’s Handbooks where in-
formation regarding the income statement/ winning and loss account for every company
could be retrieved. The main motivation for the computation has been to adjust the com-
pany’s profit to reflect i) yearly movements in the untaxed equity items and ii) expenses
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considered as primarily tax motivated. Adjusting for net changes in untaxed equity will
construct a profit expression that is more consistent with the revenue recognition prin-
ciple. Revenues are taxed when they are recognized, and expenses are tax deductible
when they incur. The tax system and accounting law prior to 1992 made it feasible for
a company to deduct tax on for instance supplementary depreciation costs, a rule that
implied that many companies expensed costs before the cost was realized. When costs
are being expensed before they incur, the profit measure is less representative and com-
parable between firms. Instead of bearing the additional cost, the funds could become a
part of the company’s retained earnings. Thus, we have chosen to adjust for costs that
is expensed due to the favorable tax deduction and not due to the actual realization of
the cost. The adjustment is based on the formula presented in equation (4.1), where t is
the tax rate.
Adj.Profit = Unadj.Profit+ (1 − t) ∗ (NetUntaxedProvisions+ TaxMotivatedExp)
(4.1)
The net provision to funds categorized as taxed equity make up the “unadjusted profit”
in equation (4.1). If a company allocates a fraction of excess profit to taxed equity-
funds, this will incorrectly reduce the bottom line. Contrary, if a cost is financed by a
prior provision to a taxed equity-fund, this will not affect the profit of the firm as a cost
generally should. By not adjusting the profit, revenue deposited to provisions and costs
financed by provisions would not affect the firm’s bottom line.
The adjustments of expenses considered as tax motivated have been challenging to com-
plete and are based on both rules and discretion. In the following, we present some of
our assumptions that the adjustments of tax motivated expenses are based on.
Opening Depreciation and Additional Depreciation
Depreciation is a method of allocating the cost of the use of an asset over the asset’s
lifetime. The yearly depreciation cost is supposed to reflect the decrease in the value
of assets due to ordinary wear and tear. The taxation law provides standards of how
much of the depreciation costs that is tax deductible for a company. The taxation law in
Norway introduced on the 6th of July 1957, gave Norwegian companies the opportunity
to depreciate a higher amount than ordinary depreciation costs in an asset’s first years of
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operation (Central Bureau of Statistics Norway, 1958). The law distinguished between
opening- and additional depreciation.
Additional depreciation could, under certain circumstances, appear as an increase of
the ordinary depreciation costs. The additional amount depreciated could constitute
50 % of the ordinary depreciation costs in the first five years of the assets operation
time. However, the amount could not make up more than 2 % of the acquisition cost
for a particular year. Also, the additional depreciation should not affect the ordinary
depreciation cost and the cost of the assets would consequently be partitioned over a
shorter time period.
Opening depreciations were relevant for plants and machinery used in commodity produc-
tion or by for instance the reparation of ships. From the beginning of the construction
work, and to the fifth year after the plant/ship was in operation, the company could
deduct tax for 25 % of the cost that exceeded 500 000 NOK per year (Central Bureau of
Statistics Norway, 1958).
As it appears from the law of taxation for our time period, opening and additional
depreciations were mainly tax motivated. Consequently, we have chosen to adjust the
firm’s profit for these depreciation costs.
Depreciation with Sales Gain
An item that also is important to justify the treatment of, is depreciation cost made with
sales gain. When a company obtains a sales gain a specific year, the profit could either
cover costs occurring in the same period or be set aside as a provision for funding future
cost. In our categorization process, depreciation with sales gain only affects the adjusted
profit if it emerges as a provision to a fund categorized as untaxed equity or if the position
in the financial statement indicates that the cost is tax motivated.
Extraordinary Depreciation
In some cases, companies have extraordinary depreciation costs. In contrast to opening
and additional depreciation, we do not have sufficient information to identify the rea-
soning behind the extraordinary depreciation costs. Thus, we have only adjusted for
these expenses if they appear as tax motivated depreciation based on its position in the
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financial statement.
Revaluation Gains and Impairment Costs
As with the depreciation of sales gain and extraordinary depreciation costs, revaluation
gains and impairment costs only affect the adjusted profit if its position in the financial
statement suggests that it should. The assumption is interpreted strictly, which implies
that the position of the item is important to identify and consider. As the income
statement format differs throughout our time period, our interpretation might bias our
adjusted profit to some degree (see subsection 4.3.2 which considers the deviation between
adjusted profit and reported profit).
As described in the section above, computing a measure for adjusted profit has proven
to be unmanageable without some degree of subjective interpretations.
4.2.3 Adjusted Market Value/Stock Price
Referring to section 4.1.2, the market values and adjusted prices included in our final
data set are mainly retrieved from Buer (2013). Market values are computed in applying
formula (4.2).
MarketV aluet = SharesOutstandingt ∗ UnadjustedSharePricet (4.2)
For a few companies, the shares outstanding deviated from the share information available
in Kierulf’s handbooks. In these cases, the number of shares outstanding was updated
in order to compute an accurate market value. The unadjusted share price was retrieved
from Buer (2013) except for a few cases where we had to use the handbooks.
To compare the historical stock returns over time, the stock prices were adjusted for
changes in share capital (Buer, 2013). The majority of the prices were already adjusted
by Buer (2013). However, as some capital adjustments were omitted, we made some
necessary adjustments to complete the data set, following the same procedure as described
in in Buer’s thesis (Buer, 2013, p 17).
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4.3. Data Selection
To arrive at the final data set, several assumptions and somewhat critical choices have
been crucial to implement. We elaborate on these choices in the following subsections.
4.3.1 Selection of Group Balance or Parent Balance
For some companies, Kierulf’s handbooks contained information regarding both the group
balance and the parent balance. For these companies, the consolidated balance is im-
plemented in the data set, as the market value of a company initially reflects the entire
group, not only the parent company. The consolidated balance sheet presents the ag-
gregate financial position of the group where internal items are netted. However, the
difference between the total assets values of the two balances were marginal. One ex-
ception was A/S Sigmalm, a shipping company included in our data set. In this case,
the deviation between the consolidated balance and the parent balance was substantial.
Furthermore, one of the subsidiary companies were already included in our set of data.
Thus, the registration and categorization are based on the parent balance instead.
The occurrence of two different balances might have biased the data set as the handbooks
in rare occasions only provided the income statements for the parent company and not
the consolidated income statements. Thus, the unadjusted and adjusted profit were not
fully consistent with the implemented balance sheet. However, as most of the companies
reported complete information regarding both the group and parent company, in addi-
tion to only minor differences occurring between the two balance sheets, we regard this
potential bias as modest.
4.3.2 Reported (Unadjusted) Profit and Adjusted Profit
The final data set includes two measures of profit; registered profit and adjusted profit.
Referring to section 4.2.2, adjusted profit is computed based on the income statement/winning
and loss account collected from the handbooks. The reported profit is retrieved directly
from the handbooks without further adjustments. The development of the total reported
and adjusted profits are plotted in figure 4.2. As can be seen from the figure, the two
measures are highly correlated.
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In the period 1961-1977, the reported profit was defined as “earnings after depreciation
costs”. From 1978 to 1989, the reported profit was measured as “earnings before provi-
sions”. Adjusted profit will correct for the majority, but not all, of the provisions reported
after “earnings before provisions”. This may explain why the adjusted profit consistently
is lower than the reported profit for the latter of the two time periods.
Both the adjusted profits and the reported profits give rise to different types of un-
certainty. The process of adjusting the companies’ bottom line is based on multiple
assumptions, outlined in subsection 4.2.2, that may not always hold true. Furthermore,
the reported profit might report a bottom line that deviates from the companies’ true
performance for a specific year, due to the common practice of exploiting tax-beneficial
provisions. Despite unequal sources to uncertainty, figure 4.2 shows that the correlation
between the two measures is high. Thus, we have chosen to primarily include adjusted
profit in the following descriptive analysis of the OSE as the reported profit measure
generally exhibits the same findings. The reported profits term, and the indicators cal-
culated based on it, is mainly used as a control measure to ensure the reasonability of
the adjusted profits.
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4.3.3 Reported (Unadjusted) Equity and Adjusted Equity
Referring to subsection 4.2.1, the untaxed equity share is equally proportioned to taxed
equity and non-interest bearing debt. Thus, we have two equity measures included in
our data set; reported (unadjusted) equity and adjusted equity. Reported equity solely
consists of the items classified as taxed equity and adjusted equity comprises reported
equity plus 50 % of the untaxed equity items. We will base our analyses on the adjusted
equity term. The reported equity, and the indicators calculated based on it, are primarily
used as control measures to ensure the reasonability of the adjusted equity.
To prepare the data set for the analyses, all observations where the adjusted or reported
equity is below zero are removed, in line with Fama and French (1993). As these obser-
vations are extreme and unusual, they could create an unnecessary bias in the analyses.
4.3.4 Measures of Central Tendency
When analyzing the overall trend of our assembled data set, we will mainly make use of
three different kinds of measurements; the equally-weighted average, the value-weighted
average (weighted by market value) and the median. Whereas the equally-weighted av-
erage is generally more affected by the smaller stocks, the value-weighted average to a
larger extent is driven by large companies such as Norsk Hydro. Additionally, the volatil-
ity tends to be higher for the equally-weighted average as the smaller-cap firms often are
more volatile. The median is a measure of central tendency that in general is not affected
by extreme observations.
As the main approach, the value-weighted mean is used as the measure of central ten-




It is crucial that our data set constitutes a representative sample of the OSE. If the
selection procedure excludes companies (observations) on a non-random basis, this can
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give rise to selection bias (Berk, 1983). Our data set consists of few very small firms,
as we have selected companies based on the size of their market value. Therefore, our
sample might not fully represent the characteristics of the smallest firms listed on OSE.
As explained at the beginning of this chapter, companies in our data set make up for a
smaller share of the total value of OSE during the 1980s compared to the 1960s and 1970s
(review figure 4.1). Even though this may weaken our sample’s representativeness in this
period, the decline in share is justified by the motivation of our data set assembling.
When assembling the data set, our main goal has been to extend and supplement the
existing available information about Norwegian companies’ financials. Until now, this
has only been available from 1980 and onward. The companies dominating the OSE
during the 1960s and the 1970s are the most influential of our data set. Although we
have supplemented the sample with information about the most dominant firms during
the 1980s that initially was not included, there will still be instances of companies of
a considerable size which are not included. Another priority in our thesis has been to
include a significant amount of companies representing the different sectors at the OSE.
The desired diversification may have been achieved at the expense of some relatively large
companies in other sectors. For example, smaller shipping companies might have been
included, instead of an industrial company of larger size, to ensure the representativeness
of the shipping sector. Tables 9.28-9.36 give an overview of the market value each sector
represents and the amount of companies from each sector the data set consists of.
4.4.2 The Use of DataStream
From 1981, DataStream (DS) is able to provide us with financial statements for sev-
eral companies included in our data set. Thus, numbers that are manually sorted from
Kierulf’s handbooks will be compared directly to the numbers obtained from DataStream.
Table 4.1 shows which economic variables from DS we have chosen to match our manually
sorted categories. Even though this has slightly reduced the workload associated with
the data collection, it has also introduced some additional potential weaknesses to our
data set.
Most importantly, there may be some differences concerning the underlying assumptions
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behind the categorization, resulting in some deviations with regards to the different fi-
nancial numbers. For example, what we have categorized as interest-bearing debt may
not correspond to what is qualified as interest-bearing debt (“Total Debt”) in DS.
Secondly, as DS only could provide information about some of the companies included in
the data set, the potential differences in assumptions between the sources is only relevant
for a share of our companies. Thus, the possible deviations are not consistent between
firms.
Table 4.1 – DataStream Terms
Kierulf ’s Handbooks DataStream (mnemonic)
Taxed (Reported) Equity Equity Capital and Reserves (WC03501)
Interest-Bearing Debt Total Debt (WC03255)
Non-Interest Bearing Debt Total Liabilities (WC03351) – Total Debt (WC03255)
Untaxed equity Total Assets (WC02999) – Equity Capital and Re-
serves (WC03501) - Total Liabilities(WC03351)
# of Shares*Share Price 31.12 Market Capitalization (WC08001)
Corresponding terms for Kierulf’s Handbooks and DataStream (mnemonic)
4.4.3 Lack of Coinciding Information
In our data set, we link market and accounting information at year-end. However, dis-
closed accounting information is typically not available until March/April the following
year. Thus, the stock value at year-end will not fully reflect the current year’s accounting
information. Despite the disadvantages this causes, the simplification has been necessary
as our sources only provided one stock price per year.
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5. Characteristics of the Oslo Stock Exchange
5.1. Market Value
During our period of interest, OSE was characterized by a large increase in market value
from the end of 1982, after a dip during the second half of the 1970s. 1975-1983 was
characterized by unstable stock prices, where an optimism and increase in price one year
was followed by pessimism and stock price decrease the next year (Kigen, 1994). The
development in real and nominal market value is displayed in figure 5.1. 1983 marks the
beginning of an increasing trend in market value that continued for the rest of our time
period. As mentioned in chapter 2, an increasing demand for stocks can be viewed as
one reason for the expansion. Also, the Norwegian economy experienced an upturn and
firms were earning higher profits (the development in real adjusted profit is displayed in
figure 9.1 in appendix). As corporations obtained better results, their retained earnings
increased, which again positively affected the market value of equity.
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Our data set includes companies from four different industries: shipping, banking, in-
surance and the industrial sector. The industrial sector is the largest one, representing
66.5 % of the total market value included in our data set. From 1961-1989, the OSE
was dominated by a few large companies, where Norsk Hydro on average amounted 48.5
%1 of the total market value listed on the stock exchange (figure 5.2 displays the market
share of Norsk Hydro for 1961-1989). The largest companies’ share of the market value
at OSE has always been significantly large, but has varied over time. One example occurs
during the 1970s when Norsk Hydro’s contribution boosted due to oil discoveries on the
Norwegian continental shelf. Furthermore, the fluctuation in Hydro’s market value and
market share can also be explained by variations in the oil price. For example, the market
value of Hydro peaked, as a share of total market value, around 1979 when the oil price
increased by over 50 % (Lie, 2015).
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5.1.2 Stock Returns
The yearly stock return for OSE, based on equally-weighted average, value-weighted
average and the median is presented in figure 5.3. The stock returns are generally in line
1Aritmetic average over time
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Figure 5.3 – The yearly average stock return based on equally-weighted average, value-weighted
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with what we would expect when the historical context is taken into consideration. The
Norwegian economy has, since the 1970s, been an oil dominated economy, and has been a
large international exporter of oil (Driesprong et al., 2008). Thus, the Norwegian market
is generally positively affected by oil price increases. As figure 5.3 shows, the stock returns
experienced a peak in 1973 due to OPEC’s oil price increase. A following dip occurs in
1974 as the oil crisis affected the word economy. Similarly, the oil price increase in 1979
resulted in an increase in stock returns. Looking at the different average stock return
measures, we observe that the value-weighted average experiences a larger increase. This
is due to Norsk Hydro’s strong dependence on the oil price and its dominance on the
OSE. An additional peak occurs in 1983, most likely due to the introduction of the more
liberal credit policies, increased retained company earnings and the increased activity
at the OSE (Kigen, 1994). These events have largely affected the economy as a whole.
Lastly, the stock returns are negative in 1986 and 1987 due to the oil price decrease, the




Referring to subsection 4.2.1, interest bearing debt was separated from non-interest bear-
ing debt when the firm’s balance sheets were categorized. In our further analysis, it is
appropriate to compute the firms invested capital, i.e. the net amount a company has
invested in its business and which require a return through the business activities (Pe-
tersen et al., 2017, p. 114). Invested capital is initially defined as the difference between
operating assets and operating liabilities, or as equity plus interest bearing liabilities mi-
nus financial assets and represents the most crucial source of value creation in a business.
The amount of interest bearing debt and equity solely disclose the financial structure of
the business, not what a company do to generate value.
Total assets can be separated in operating assets and financial assets, where the operating
assets is the capital the firm is dependent on to run their daily operations. As our
categorization is limited to the right side of the balance sheet, we have not been able to
deduct the financial assets from operating assets. This is a weakness in our computation of
invested capital. Furthermore, we have identified non-interest bearing debt as operating
liabilities. We consider the liabilities as the necessary amount required for running the
daily operations of a business. Based on these assumptions, invested capital is computed
as shown in equation (5.1):
InvestedCapital = TotalAssets−NonInterestBearingDebt (5.1)
Figure 5.4 plots the development in the total invested capital for companies listed at OSE
for 1961-1989. At the same time as the total market value increased during the 1980s,
the invested capital also expanded. There are at least two possible explanations for the
correlation between the two quantities. First, the market value may increase as a result
of the company’s increased investments. Second, the relationship may also be justified
by the fact that companies are more able to invest when their capital base increase. As
figure 5.4 illustrates, the amount of investments steeply increases in the period 1983-1986
before the growth rate slightly drops during the oil price fall in 1986 and the bank crisis
in 1987.
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The share of equity has traditionally been low in the Norwegian corporate environment.
Despite various initiatives over the years, it has historically proved difficult to raise the
level of equity to a decent level. However, when the OSE changed character in the
beginning of the 1980s, the opportunity to turn this trend around emerged (Cameron,
1994).
To take a closer look at the capital structure of the companies during our time period, we
have examined the debt ratio over time, calculated as the interest bearing debt divided
by the invested capital. Figure 5.5 depicts the debt ratio for 1961-1989, and figure 5.6
illustrates the debt ratio for each specific sector.2 During the 1960s and 1970s, the
credit market was strictly regulated. However, the activity at the OSE was low, and
the companies therefore mainly issued debt. Figure 5.5 shows a growth in debt ratio in
these two decades. Considering figure 5.6, the industry sector had a low debt ratio in the
1960s and in the beginning of the 1970s. As the industry sector comprised the majority
2Our calculated debt ratio level seems to be slightly lower than equivalent numbers provided by
Jensen (1969) and NOS Accounting Statistics (1968-78), sources obtained from (Knutsen, 1994, p. 68).
They compute a debt ratio fluctuating around 70-80 % during the 1970s, compared to our ratio in the
lower 70 %.
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Figure 5.5 – Development in the total debt ratio for all sectors measured by value-weighted average
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of the companies with the highest market values, the aggregate value-weighted average
presented in figure 5.5 is driven down.
In the beginning of the 1980s, the credit market was deregulated. The deregulation made
debt more accessible for companies. On the other hand, companies generally obtained
higher earnings during the 1980s (figure 9.1 in appendix displays the development in real
adjusted profit). The increased retained earnings made equity financing more accessible.
The increased interest rate that followed the Brundtland government in 1986 also affected
the debt ratio negatively. These effects may have limited the growth of debt, in the period
1984-1987 shown in figure 5.5, to some extent.
Similarly, the level of earnings of the different sectors affect the sector-specific level of
debt ratio. For instance, the relatively high debt ratio of the shipping sector may be
explained by the fact that they generally had low earnings (see table 9.4 in appendix).
Likewise, the industrial sector has a low debt ratio, compared to the other sectors, due
to the sector being profitable and obtaining bottom-lines of considerable sizes (shown in
table 9.2 in appendix).
Overall, the aggregate debt ratio grows from 1984 to 1987. The debt ratio declines after
the stock market crash and bank crisis in 1987. This may be due to companies that were
heavily debt financed going bankrupt.
During the 1980s, the market value of companies listed at OSE also increased drastically.
If the debt ratio calculation takes the market value of equity into account, we observe
that the market debt ratio decreases by 21 %3 from 1982 to 1989.
5.3. Key Indicators
5.3.1 Return on Equity
The return on equity (ROE) is used to measure the profitability of the firms and is
computed as shown in equation 5.2, where adjusted profit is measured after tax. We have
chosen to smooth the adjusted profit by creating a 3-year moving average (3YMAROEt)
321 % is computed by dividing total interest-bearing debt over interest-bearing debt plus aggregate
market value.
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as earnings during our selected time period have proved to be volatile. ROE for the












The 1960s have often been referred to as “the golden years”, characterized by a long,
Figure 5.7 – Development in the 3-year moving average of return on equity (3YMAROE) for
companies listed at OSE in 1961-1989. Both value-weighted and equally-weighted measures are
shown. 3YMAROE is based on adjusted equity and adjusted profit.
coherent boom (Hodne and Grytten, 2000). This is reflected in the steadily high return
on equity in this subperiod. Even though the rise in the oil price in 1973 should have
resulted in a positive profitability increase of the overall Norwegian economy, due to its oil-
dominated features, the effect is minimal. The oil price boom permanently increased the
price and wage level in Norway compared to competing countries, resulting in decreased
competitive power (Hodne and Grytten, 2000), which may explain the modest upturn in
figure 5.7. During the oil crisis in 1974, figure 5.7 shows a sharp downturn in profitability.
A lower ROE also appears for the consecutive years. Further, the beginning of the 1980s
was characterized by large increases in company profitability, with a downturn during
the recession in 1982 and the stock market crash and bank crisis in 1987.
It is also of interest to look at the profitability development over time for the different
sectors, as they may have deviating reactions to economic events. Figure 5.8 displays
30
the value-weighted 3-year moving average of the ROE for each specific sector. A quick
Figure 5.8 – Return on equity (ROE) based on value-weighted 3 year moving average for the
different sectors represented at OSE, 1961-1989. ROE is based on adjusted equity and adjusted
profit.
glance at the cross-sectional profitability developments presented in figure 5.8 shows the
increasing profitability in the shipping sector during the 1960s. The shipping industry
contributed with 22-26 % of total investments made in Norway during this period. In
addition, the investments in the shipping sector proved to be the most profitable (Norwe-
gian Shipowners Association). The development in the offshore industry also introduced
a new dimension to Norwegian maritime transport. Likewise, the oil activity stagnation
during the oil crisis in 1974 resulted in an excess tonnage surplus, which substantially
affected the profitability for the shipping sector. During the international stock market
crash and bank crisis in 1987, the banking and insurance sectors were especially affected.
The banking sector naturally experienced a substantial peak in ROE after the dereg-
ulation of the credit market. However, they also suffered great losses when the bank
crisis emerged. Figure 5.8 shows that the ROE of the industry sector is relatively stable
compared to the other sectors.
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5.3.2 Price-Book Ratio
The Price-Book Ratio compares a company’s market value to its book value. The ratio is
computed by dividing the market capitalization, based on the closing price, by the book
value of the company’s equity at the end of a fiscal year (as shown in equation (5.3)).






Figure 5.9 – Aggregate adjusted P/B ratio, OSE 1961-1989. The computation is based on adjusted
book value of equity.
Figure 5.10 displays the aggregate P/B ratio based on adjusted equity for our time pe-
riod4. Looking at the P/B ratio over time, an expected increase occurs in 1973. This is
due to OPEC’s oil price increase and the following optimism for Norway’s oil dominated
industry composition. The increase is mostly caused by Norsk Hydro, where operations
were strongly dependent on the oil price. A similar rise occurs in 1979 when the oil
price was increased even further. The peak in 1981 (when considering the value-weighted
average) is driven by the firm Norsk Data. The Norsk Data stock increased by 517.3 %
in 1981, which may be explained by their international financial break through as they
4Figure 9.6 in appendix plots the aggregate P/B ratio based on unadjusted equity.
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were listed at the London Stock Exchange the same year. As expected, the P/B increases
more steadily after 1983, as the market values also expanded5. Lastly, the aggregate ra-
tio seems to not be as affected by the bank crisis in 1987 as we initially expected. The
Figure 5.10 – Sector specific variation in P/B, based on value-weighted average and adjusted equity.
sector-specific variation in adjusted P/B is presented in figure 5.10. As expected, the
industry sector P/B is to a large extent affected by the oil price changes in 1973, 1979
and Norsk Data in 1981. The strong correlation between the industry sector and the oil
price also drives the overall development of the P/B multiple.
The level of P/B is relatively low in the banking sector. This may be partly due to
the characteristic features of the banks accounting sheets and standards. As banks have
fairly liquid assets, the registered book value will be closer to the market value. In
addition, strict regulations make it harder to expect high future growth rates for financial
institutions.
The P/B of the shipping sector increased as Norwegian oil was discovered in 1969. Due
to the shipping crisis and recession after 1973, the sector had lower P/B values in the
following years. As already addressed, the P/B is often used to determine whether a
stock is over or undervalued. If the stock is undervalued, positive future stock returns
may be justified. This constitutes the basis for our further analysis presented in chapter
6.
5The development in market value is displayed in figure 5.1.
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5.3.3 Price-Earnings Ratio
The Price Earnings ratio is another popular way to measure value as the ratio divides
the market value of a firm by the companies’ earnings. The ratio shows the multiple of
earnings an investor is paying to own the stock. A high P/E ratio can for instance be
justified when a company is expecting high growth in future earnings (which is reflected
in the stock price of a company), compared to earnings today. In addition to exploring
the relationship between P/B and future stock return, the papers authored by Fama and
French (1992) and Lakonishok et al. (1994) also address the connection between the P/E
multiple and the stock’s future performance. Similar to the low P/B-firms, companies
with low P/E ratio tend to earn a higher future stock return. Fama and French (1992)
explain the relationship by risk compensation, as low P/E companies tend to be riskier.
Also equivalent to the P/B-argumentation, Lakonishok et al. (1994) propose that in-
vestors have a tendency to exaggerate the importance of historical company performance
on future company performance. A poor performing company will thus be undervalued,
as the future earnings are underestimated.
Following Graham and Dodd (1934, obtained from Champbell and Shiller (2001)), prior
earnings should be smoothed when computing the P/E ratio as earnings for a specific year
is often too volatile to be a good measure of a company’s true ability to achieve future
growth. Champbell and Shiller (2001) further developed the importance of smoothed
earnings through the CAPE ratio (cyclically adjusted P/E ratio, also known as the Shiller
P/E). Initially, the CAPE ratio is based on smoothed earnings for a longer period of time
(often 10 years). When operating with long time horizons, inflation adjustments are more
important. As we are only operating with averages over three years, we have chosen to
use nominal numbers in the computation of the CAPE ratio. The yearly aggregate CAPE
ratio is computed based on equation 5.4.
CAPEt =
MarketV aluet




The time variation in the CAPE ratio for the aggregate economy, is presented in figure
5.11. Figure 5.12 shows the value weighted CAPE ratio for the four sectors respectively.
Champbell and Shiller (2001) have examined how the outlook for the aggregate future
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Figure 5.11 – The graph illustrates the variation in the yearly average of the cyclically adjusted
price equity (CAPE) ratio for OSE, 1961-1989. The straight line display the average CAPE ratio
for the selected time period. The CAPE ratio is based on a value-weighted 3 year average of prior
adjusted profits.
Figure 5.12 – Illustration of the variation in the yearly CAPE ratio for each sector at OSE, 1961-
1989. The CAPE multiple is based on a value-weighted 3 year average of prior adjusted profit.
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stock market develops when the CAPE ratio is deviating from normal historical levels.
According to mean reversion theory, it seems reasonable to believe that a CAPE ratio
deviating substantially from normal levels will move towards average levels over time. In
figure 5.11, the straight line presents the average CAPE ratio for the period 1961-1989.
When the ratio is close to a historical peak (1973 and 1987), the stock market is often
at the brink of a decline. A high CAPE value could indicate that the stock market is
overvalued, as the stock price is high relative to earnings on an aggregate level. Revisiting
figure 5.3 in subsection 5.1.2, the CAPE ratio can be compared to the average yearly stock
returns. The important turning point in 1973 can be reflected in the CAPE multiple and
is followed by negative stock returns in the subsequent years. Taking figure 5.12 into
consideration, the drops in the aggregate CAPE ratio are mainly due to the downturns
in the industrial sector. The shipping sector is the industry with lowest CAPE ratios
through most of the 1960s and the entire 1970s. The years 1984-1985 are also interesting
to investigate. The oil price declines in 1986, which is reflected through the reduced
CAPE ratio for the shipping sector. In 1987, the industry sector experienced a drastic
CAPE-level increase, in contrast to the bank sector and shipping sector, where the ratio
declines. While the industry CAPE ratio drops the following years, the bank sector and
shipping sector experience a modest increase.
In the following empirical analysis, we have chosen to only examine the relationship
between the P/B ratio and future stock returns, as the CAPE ratio is subject to higher
volatility compared to the P/B measure.
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6. Empirical Approach and Analysis
In the two following sections, we will further analyze the P/B ratio of the firms listed at
OSE in the period 1961-1989 through assessing our two presented hypotheses.
6.1. Hypothesis 1
A low (high) P/B ratio is associated with a high (low) future long-term return.
6.1.1 Methodical Approach
As previously discussed, the P/B has been found to be a good predictive indicator of
the future stock return, both on the aggregate (market) level and on the firm level. The
researched relationship between P/B and future stock returns mainly concerns the long-
term stock return, rather than shorter time horizons. To measure the long-term future
return, we compute the geometric mean of the annual stock returns in the subsequent 5
years (5Y R), as presented in equation (6.1).
5Y R = ((1 + r1) ∗ (1 + r2) ∗ ... ∗ (1 + r5))
1
5 − 1 (6.1)
As equation (6.1) illustrates, the five-year long-term future stock return in 1961 is the
geometric mean of the stock returns in the years 1962-1966, the long-term future stock
return in 1962 is the geometric mean of the stock returns in the years 1963-1967 and so
on.
Market Level Analysis
First, we wish to examine the aggregate relationship by analyzing how the variation in
future long-term market return (5YMR) can be explained by the variation in the market
P/B ratio (MPB)1. Both variables are based on market value-weighted averages. Equation
(6.2) shows the time-series regression analyzing the relationship on the aggregate level.
5YMRt = α + β1MPBt + ε (6.2)
In the analysis, we have included robust standard errors to avoid problems with het-
eroscedasticity and autocorrelation in residuals. In the regression, we include a 5-year
1An Augmented Dicky Fuller test (displayed in table 9.2 in appendix) shows that the time-series is
stationary, and differentiating is thus not necessary.
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lag of the long-term return (5YMRt−5) to pick up any effect caused by mean reverting
trends in stock prices and returns. Poterba and Summers (1988) provide results indicat-
ing a positive relationship between previous and future returns in short horizons, but an
inverse connection for longer horizons. However, at the same time, they were also unable
to statistically reject a random-walk price process.
Apart from the lagged 5-year market return (5YMRt−5) and the variables of interest
(P/B), we also include the control variables SIZE, RISK and PROFITABILITY.
SIZE (MV)
The size of a market is driven by the size of the firms it consists of. The size of the firm is
in itself a variable affecting stock returns according to fundamental value theory, as firms
with a higher required rate of return have a lower market value (Berk, 1995). One possible
explanation for the firm size’s direct effect on the future stock return is presented by Klein
and Bawa (1977, obtained from Banz (1981)). The amount of information available about
a company’s stock is related to the size of the firm, due to both the level of trading activity
and number of sophisticated investors involved. As investors do not want to hold stocks
when there is an insufficient amount of information available about the firm, they will
limit their investments to the larger and more information-rich firms (Banz, 1981). As
Banz (1978) showed that such ”undesirable” stocks have higher risk-adjusted returns, the
lack of information about small firms might explain why these stocks experience higher
future returns. The future stock return being affected by the size of firms will later be
referred to as ”the size effect”.
In addition to affecting the future stock return directly, size serves as a catch-all proxy for
several other indicators like risk, growth, barriers-to-entry and economies of scale. Size
can be a proxy for risk as small firms generally are more risky than larger firms. This is
mainly because smaller firms have a smaller capital buffer in times of financial distress,
making them more exposed to fluctuations in the business environment. Furthermore, size
and growth are connected as smaller firms tend to be less mature (Lev, 1983). According
to Life Cycle Theories, younger (smaller) firms grow at a faster rate than more mature
firms. Barriers-to-entry can also be represented by the size of the firm, as it is harder
to enter the market or threaten a company’s market position if the firm is large and
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dominant. Lastly, the larger the firm is, the easier it will be to exploit economies of scale.
We use market value as a measure of market/firm size. As the distribution of firm’s
market values is skewed, the natural logarithm of market value is used.
RISK (DR)
It is natural to assume that the bankruptcy risk of the firms in the market will have an
impact on the future stock return, as investors will demand a premium for holding assets
that are more likely to go bankrupt. The leverage of the firm functions as a proxy for
this type of risk as risk increases when the level of debt does. In our model, leverage is
measured as the debt ratio.
PROFITABILITY (ROE)
The profitability of firms has been found to have an impact on future stock returns
(Hillestad, 2007). Having a high ROE may indicate that the company has a competitive
advantage, making it easier to sustain their position in the market. Additionally, many
investors are attracted to profitable companies, which will bid up the stock price (Frankel
and Lee, 1998). There are also arguments for the opposite effect. Investors tend to expect
that the historical performance will preserve in the future. This is not always the case,
and stock returns may be inversely affected if the companies do not sustain the investors’
expectations. In our analysis, ROE is used to measure the profitability of the companies
in the market.
All the included control variables may explain some of the variation initially picked up by
the P/B ratio. Thus, it is of interest to look at the correlation between the explanatory
variables (see table 9.1 in appendix), to further examine whether they measure equivalent
effects. For example, size and P/B are both dependent on market value and will increase
as the market value increases, as shown by a positive correlation coefficient of 0.39 in
the correlation matrix. Similarly, profitability and P/B both factor in the book value of
equity, emphasized by a correlation coefficient of 0.36. Likewise, the market value and
ROE have a correlation coefficient of 0.29. Despite the relationship between the variables,
the correlation is low enough to dismiss potential multicollinearity problems.
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By adding these control variables, we end up with the regression presented in (6.3)2.
In the equation, 5YMRt is the long-term market return, MPBt is the market P/B,
ln(MV )t is the market size, MDRt is the market debt ratio and MROEt is the market
profitability.
5YMRt = α+ β1MPBt + β25YMRt−5 + β3ln(MV )t + β4MDRt + β5MROEt + ε (6.3)
Firm Level Analysis
To analyze the relationship further, we conduct a panel data regression to examine the
link between the future long term return and P/B both over time and across companies.
To control for market index variations, we use the abnormal return over the market index
return (avg5Y SRt) as the independent variable. The future long-term abnormal return
is calculated as presented in equation (6.4).
abn5Y SRi,t = 5Y SRi,t − avg5Y SRt (6.4)
In equation 6.4, abn5Y SRi,t is the abnormal 5-year stock return over the market return
for stock i at time t, avg5Y SRt is the market index return in year t and 5Y SRi,t is the
5-year stock return for stock i at time t.
Equation (6.5) shows the panel data regression. The analysis is controlled for fixed effects
(time-invariant effects). We have adjusted the standard errors of the coefficient estimates,
as ignoring potential correlation in the regression may lead to biased statistical inference.
In contrast to the time series analysis on the market level, it is not sufficient to only
correct for autocorrelation when working with panel data; cross-sectional dependence
must also be accounted for. Therefore, we run a regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard
errors, which produces heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors that are robust to
both cross-sectional and temporal dependence (Driscoll and Kraay (1998), collected from
Hoechle (2007)).
abn5Y SRi,t = α + β1PBi,t + ε (6.5)
Similar to the market level analysis, we control for the 5-year lag of the abnormal long-
term return (abn5Y SRlag5) and the three control variables (SIZE , RISK and PROF-
2All variables in equation (6.3) are based on value-weighted averages.
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ITABILITY ). We also add an interaction variable of market value and P/B (PB∗lnMV )
to research whether the return-predictability of P/B is concentrated in firms of a specific
size (small or large).
By adding the control variables (ln(MV )i,t, DRi,t and ROEi,t), the final panel data
regression is illustrated in equation (6.6). A linear and exponential trend variable (t and
t2) is included to correct for trend stationarity in our panel data3.
abn5Y SRi,t = α + β1PBi,t + β2abn5Y SRi,t−5 + β3ln(MV )i,t + β4DRi,t
+β5ROEi,t + β6t+ β7t
2 + β8PBi,t ∗ ln(MV )i,t
(6.6)
As we have already mentioned, the OSE has been subject to substantial changes during
our period of interest. Thus, it is of interest to run the firm level regression for the different
subperiods. To supplement, we also wish to examine the cross-sectional differences by
running our model for each individual industry.
6.1.2 Empirical Results
Market Level Analysis
On the aggregate level, regressing the future 5-year market return (5YMR) on the market
price book (MPB), we obtain the time series regression results presented in table 6.1.
3To test for stationarity, we have conducted a Fisher-type unit-root test, providing a p-value of 0.504.
The test is shown in table 9.3 in appendix and suggests that the series is trend-stationary.
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Table 6.1 – Regression Results: Market Level Regression
(1) (2) (3)
5YMR 5YMR 5YMR





Observations 28 28 28
Adjusted R2 0.583 0.596 0.597
Standardized beta coefficients
Significance level denoted as: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
5YMR = 5-year market return, MPB = Market P/B, 5YMRlag5 = 5-year lag of
the average long-term market return, MDR = Market debt ratio, MROE = Market
return on equity.
The regression yields an inverse and significant relationship between the MPB and the
future long-term market return (5YMR), shown in model (1). The relationship persists
even after controlling for size, risk, profitability and the five-year lagged market return
as shown in model (3). These results indicate that a low market P/B may be a good
indication of higher market returns in the future.
Firm Level Analysis
The results of the firm level regression of abnormal future long-term is presented in table
6.2. In model (1) and (2), the results show that the contemporary P/B significantly
affects the future long-term stock return. As the coefficient is negative, a high (low) P/B
ratio is associated with a low (high) future long-term stock return. We initially expect
that the lagged 5-year abnormal stock return (abn5Y SRlag5) may capture some of the
variation earlier picked up by the P/B, as stocks with high (low) P/B typically also have
high (low) past stock returns. This may explain the slightly higher explanatory power in
model (2) compared to (1).
However, table 6.2 shows that the P/B effect disappears after controlling for size (market
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Table 6.2 – Regression Results: Firm Level Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
abn5YSR abn5YSR abn5YSR abn5YSR
PB -0.0779∗∗∗ -0.0786∗∗∗ -0.1238 -0.0706
t 0.0014 -0.0007 0.0019 0.0044
t2 0.0002 0.0003 0.0006∗ 0.0006∗





Constant 0.0631 0.0664∗ 1.944∗∗∗ 2.099∗∗∗
Observations 975 659 659 652
Adjusted R2 0.103 0.120 0.254 0.259
t statistics in parentheses
Significance level denoted as:∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
abn5YSR = abnormal 5-year stock return over the market return, t/t2 = trend
variables, abn5YSRlag5 = 5-year lag of the abnormal long-term return, MV =
market value, DR = debt ratio, ROE = return on equity.
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PB 0.0567 0.0147 0.0072
abn5YSRlag5 -0.0157 -0.0700 -0.0418
lnMV -0.187∗∗∗ -0.0893∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗
DR -0.0567 -0.0802 -0.0017
ROE 0.0018 -0.0005 0.0185
t 0.0030 -0.177 0.206
t2 0.0010 0.0067 -0.0040
Constant 3.191∗∗∗ 2.789∗∗∗ 0.917
Observations 241 316 95
Adjusted R2 0.342 0.238 0.480
t statistics in parentheses
Significance level denoted as: sym* p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
abn5YSR = abnormal 5-year stock return over the market return, t/t2 = trend vari-
ables, abn5YSRlag5 = 5-year lag of the abnormal long-term return, MV = market value,
DR = debt ratio, ROE = return on equity.
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value) as shown in model (3). Size has a negative effect on future stock returns, which is
in accordance with the theoretical evidence discussed in section 6.1.1. The explanatory
power also increases considerably when including the size-variable. These results imply
that the significant P/B effect in model (1) and (2), is in fact largely driven by the size
effect. Put differently, we assume that the P/B functions as a proxy for size4. Like Banz
(1981), the relationship between P/B and size is tested in table 9.4 in appendix. The
table shows that the size effect is still present after controlling for P/B (shown in model
(1) and (2) in table 9.4), while the P/B effect is removed when size is controlled for
(shown in model (3) and (4) in table 9.4). Therefore, we infer that P/B is a proxy for
size, and not vice versa.
Furthermore, when controlling for the additional control variables, risk (DR), profitability
(ROE) and the interaction variable (PB*lnMV), in model (4) in table (6.2), the explana-
tory power is not considerably affected. This emphasizes that the initial P/B effect is
driven by size and not one of the other control variables. Risk has a negative and sig-
nificant effect on the future stock return. The profitability effect is positive, but not
significantly different from zero. The regression result shows a positive interaction effect,
even though we initially would expect this to be negative. However, the effect is not
emphasized as the coefficient lacks significance.
Running the regression model from equation 6.6 on the different subperiods yields the
outcomes presented in table 6.3. There is no present P/B-effect in neither of the subpe-
riods. The size effect is still negative and significant, which indicates that the abnormal
future return is related to the size variations of the firms. The lower explanatory power
in the 1970s, as well as the slightly less significant size effect, may be a consequence of
the turbulent circumstances present during this period.
We also run the model for the different industries. The regression results are presented
in table 6.4. For the industrial and shipping sector, the size effect is still the dominant
factor in explaining the future long-term abnormal stock return. In the shipping sector,
4Even though P/B might function as a proxy for size, size itself will still pick up variation previously
not accounted for by using P/B, as the explanatory power of the model in table 6.2 increases when
adding the size-variable.
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Table 6.4 – Regression Results: Firm Level Regression for Different Sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
abn5YSR abn5YSR abn5YSR abn5YSR
Industry Banking Shipping Insurance
PB 0.006 0.192 -0.060 -0.533
abn5YSRlag5 -0.047 -0.223 -0.011 -0.149
lnMV -0.835∗∗∗ -0.579 -0.555∗∗∗ -0.398
DebtRatio -0.027 0.188 -0.135∗∗ 0.283
ROE 0.009 -0.093 0.025 -0.042
t -0.024 1.710 -0.138 -0.173
t2 0.613 -1.255 0.778∗∗ 0.441
Observations 293 59 249 51
Adjusted R2 0.227 0.167 0.354 0.285
Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses
Significance level denoted as:∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
abn5YSR = abnormal 5-year stock return over the market return, abn5YSRlag5
= 5-year lag of the abnormal long-term stock return, MV = market value, ROE
= return on equity, t/t2 = trend variables.
the risk (debt ratio) is also significant. The effect is negative, which contradicts the theory
presented in section 6.1.1, as we initially would expect increased leverage (and risk) to
result in a risk premium.
To sum up our findings regarding our first hypothesis, we find that there is an inverse
relationship between P/B and future long-term stock return on the aggregate (market)
level. However, when examining the relationship on firm level , the P/B effect diminishes
when we control for size. The firm level findings are persistent for the different industries
and subperiods. This is in line with Næs et al. (2008), who also found that smaller
firms listed on OSE have experienced a higher stock return. They only found P/B to be
significant between 1980-1989, whereas size was found to be significant for their entire
period of interest (1980-2006).
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6.1.3 Weaknesses and Robustness of the Analysis
Future stock returns might be affected by macroeconomic variables not included in our
study, like interest rate, inflation, exchange rate and the oil price. By not including
these factors in our analysis, we may potentially encounter endogeneity problems, where
unobserved macro variables affect both the independent and dependent variable and
implicitly explain the underlying connection. However, given a potential relationship
between a macroeconomic variable and the future stock return, such a correlation is
challenging to detect empirically. Næs et al. (2008) have explored whether macroeconomic
variables are priced in the Norwegian market5, but they do not report significant results.
It seems likely that these factors affect firms through their expected cash flows, and not
through stakeholders return. Also, Næs et al. (2008) emphasize that the stock market
can be viewed as a leading indicator for the economy, instead of the other way around.
Including macroeconomic variables is thus a challenging task, as the stock price might
reflect macroeconomic relations before they are observable in macroeconomic data. In
order to solve potential endogeneity problems, our model controls for fixed effects to
minimize the analytical consequences of the potential bias.
In addition to solving endogeneity problems, working with panel data has many advan-
tages. First, it enables us to control for unobserved individual-specific and time-invariant
heterogeneity, which initially could lead to biased estimators. Second, the sample sizes
are larger than a single cross-section sample, which reduce the standard deviation and
provides more precise estimates. However, when the length of the time period differs be-
tween firms (unbalanced data set), the use of panel data raises additional issues. When
the variation is not random (for example by less profitable firms having higher exit rates),
this should preferably be taken into account.
As mentioned in section 4.4.3, the financial statements of companies is not public until
March/April. Therefore, financial information that initially should be comprised in the
stock price is not available at year-end. This constitutes a weakness of our analysis, as
we are matching stock returns and indicators based on the financial statements at the
5For the time period 1980-2006
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end of the year.
Lastly, as we are operating with yearly returns, the periodicity of the data set is large.
Using yearly data instead of monthly introduces additional weaknesses to our study.
Causal variables that change and affect the future stock return on a more frequent basis
are less integrated in the yearly analysis. However, more frequent data has not been
available, both due to the lack of registration and low trading activity.
To test the robustness of our analysis, we winosorize our data set, limiting the extreme
values to the value of the 10 % percentiles. We test the relationship between the P/B
and future abnormal stock return on the modified sample. The results (displayed in table
9.6 in appendix) show the similar conclusions as drawn in our initial analysis. Thus, our
results are not significantly affected by outliers in our data set.
In addition, we run the aggregate regression using equally-weighted averages instead of
the value-weighted averages (regression results are displayed in table 9.5 in appendix).
By doing this, we can ensure that the results are not necessarily driven solely by the
large, dominating stocks present at OSE. The results show that the market P/B still has
a negative effect on future market return, but the significance is weakened and is only
significant at a 10 % significance level The size (MV) variable do not yield significant
results.
6.2. Hypothesis 2
Portfolios dominated by low P/B firms yield a higher mean return than portfolios domi-
nated by high P/B firms.
6.2.1 Methodical Approach
To approach our second hypothesis, we have constructed two portfolios: one consisting of
an equally-weighted combination of the firms having a P/B above the yearly median, and
one portfolio consisting of an equally-weighted combination of the firms having a P/B
below the yearly median. We use the median instead of the average as this provides a less
skewed distribution in terms of number of companies in the two different portfolios. Since
we have created a floor for P/B by excluding all companies with negative book equity, we
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will have fewer extreme observations on the left side of the distribution. We do not have
the equivalent upper limit for the P/B, causing extreme values to still occur on the right
side. These extreme values affect the average, resulting in a significantly lower number
of companies satisfying the high P/B portfolio average constraint. The median is to a
lesser extent affected and the companies are therefore more equally distributed.
As the P/B ratio varies over time, we have rebalanced the portfolios every year to ensure
that they at all times are dominated by the intended firms. The firm-specific stock returns
are calculated as a one-year buy-and-hold return, from the fiscal year end to the end of
next year (31.12). As the portfolio is constructed by equally weighting the firms that
fulfill the portfolio’s P/B criteria, the average yearly return of the portfolio is calculated
as shown in formula (6.7). In the formula, rp,eq is the portfolio return, N is the number







To account for the firm size differences in the two portfolios, we have also constructed the
value-weighted portfolios. The portfolio return (rp,vw) is calculated as shown in equation
6.8. TMV is the total market value of all firms, MVi is the market value of firm i and ri







To measure whether the low P/B portfolio performs better than the high P/B portfolio
over time, we wish to test whether the difference in next year portfolio return6 is significant
between the two. A t-test is usually used to compare two averages. However, an important
assumption behind the t-test is that the portfolio returns are normally distributed. Brown
and Warner (1985) report that stock prices and returns are distributed such that this
assumption is violated. This is especially true as we are working with yearly returns and
relatively long holding periods (time horizon), where the skewness in the distribution
seems to become increasingly important (Fama and French, 1996). Thus, we opt for a
non-parametric test. By using a non-parametric test, like the Mann-Whitney test, there
6The return difference is not adjusted for risk
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is no need to make any assumptions about the distribution of the portfolio returns. To
test whether the difference in next year portfolio return is significant between the two
portfolios, we conduct a rank-sum test and a median test.
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test (often referred to as the Mann-Whitney U-test) tests whether
the population mean ranks differ between our two samples. It determines whether the
two samples are from the same population with the same distribution (Wilcoxon (1945)
and Mann and Whitney (1947)).The median test performs a nonparametric k-sample test
on the equality of medians. The null hypothesis states that the samples were drawn from
populations with the same median.
6.2.2 Empirical Results
Equally-Weighted Portfolios
The summary statistics of the two equally-weighted portfolios are presented in table 6.5,
and shows that the high P/B portfolio contains larger firms in terms of market value.
Furthermore, investors are typically inclined to pay higher multiples of book value for a
company that proves to be profitable. However, we observe that the low P/B portfolio
has a slightly higher return on equity (9.7 %, compared to a ROE of 9.2 % for the high
P/B portfolio. The difference is not significant). The high P/B stocks have the highest
portfolio return today (23.6 % vs. only 4.9 % in the low P/B portfolio), while the low
P/B portfolio has a higher next year return (17.5 % in comparison to 11.8 %). The
development of the different features of the two portfolios over time is plotted in figure
9.7, 9.8, 9.9, 9.10 and 9.11 presented in appendix.
Looking at risk measures, in this case the volatility of next year’s stock return and the
beta, the low P/B portfolio is slightly riskier than the high P/B portfolio (standard de-
viation of 0.29 compared to the high P/B portfolio’s standard deviation of 0.27). This
observation may indicate that the superior future portfolio return provided by the low
P/B portfolio is a result of the demanded risk compensation (according to the argumen-
tation by Fama and French (1992)). However, by controlling for (market) risk through
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Table 6.5 – Summary Statistics for the Equally-Weighted Low P/B and High P/B Portfolio
Low P/B Portf High P/B Portf LP/B – HP/B
Average Average t-statistic
Number of Observations 579 577
Total Assets 4 480 000 000 1 950 000 000 6.633 ***
Market Value 350 000 000 495 000 000 -3.317 ***
Price Book 0.60x 1.43x -33.34 ***
CAPE 28.21x 14.29x 4.583 ***
Return on Equity 9.7% 9.2% 1.602 *
Debt Ratio 0.5 0.48 0.989
Stock Return(t) 4.9% 23.6% -11.09 ***
Stock Return(t+1) 17.5% 11.8% 3.49 ***
(Future) Stock Return Volatility 0.29 0.27
Beta 1.02 0.91
Required Rate of Return 15.11% 14.40%
Abnormal Return 2.39% -2.60% 3.06 ***
The key indicators are based on equally weighted averages. Significance level is denoted as *** on a 2.5
% significance level, ** on 5 % significance level and * on 10 % significance level. Number of observations
(company years) equals number of companies multiplied with number of years. Return on Equity is the
5 year moving average of ROE. Beta is calculated based on yearly correlation between portfolio and
market. Required rate of return is based on CAPM. The risk free rate is set to the 10- year government
bond yield.
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adjusting for the required rate of return7, we observe that the low P/B portfolio main-
tains a significant superior return on a 2.5 % significance level compared to the high P/B
portfolio according to the t-statistics (3.06).
According to the t-statistics (3.49) provided in table 6.5, the future stock return is sig-
nificantly higher for the low P/B portfolio. However, as the normality of the return
distribution can be questioned, the results of the Wilcoxon rank-sum and median test is
presented below.
In our analysis of the future return8 of the two equally-weighted portfolios, the rank sum
provides a z-value of -3.39 and a corresponding p-value of 0. Thus, we can reject the
null hypothesis stating that the two samples have equal distributions. As the descriptive
statistics in table 6.5 show a larger future return for the low P/B portfolio, we can
conclude, based on the rank sum test, that the low P/B portfolio obtains a significantly
higher return compared to the high P/B portfolio. However, the median test fails to
reject the null hypothesis (p-value of 0.68), which introduces some uncertainty to the
conclusion of the rank sum test.
Value-Weighted Portfolio
The summary statistics for the value-weighted portfolios are presented in table 6.6 (the
development in the different features is plotted in figure 9.12, 9.13, 9.14, 9.15 and 9.16
in appendix). We observe that the high P/B portfolio now consists of more profitable
stocks in terms of return on equity. The historical stock return is still lower for the low
P/B portfolio. However, in contrast to the equally-weighted portfolio, the value-weighted
high P/B portfolio obtains the higher future return. The fact that the abnormal return
of the low P/B portfolio diminishes, may imply that the abnormal return obtained from
the equally-weighted portfolios might emerge from the size effect introduced in subsection
6.1.1. The reversed relationship obtained while looking at the value-weighted portfolios
may also be a result of the return predictability of P/B being concentrated in smaller
firms. This is emphasized by Banz (1981) showing that the abnormal future return is
7CAPM is used to obtain the required rate of return. The risk-free rate is set to the 10 year
government bond yield.
8Not adjusted for risk
52
larger for the very small firms.
If the return predictability of P/B is concentrated in smaller firms, the question whether
these returns are realizable is relevant. Small-cap company returns are often hard to
realize, as the trading activity of these firms are typically lower (higher liquidity pre-
mium). By creating the value-weighted portfolios, this weakness is minimized compared
to the equally-weighted construction. Through this approach, excess returns provided
by smaller companies impact the portfolios less. According to the t-statistic (-1.13) pro-
Table 6.6 – Summary Statistics for the Value-Weighted Low P/B and High P/B Portfolio
Low P/B Portf High P/B Portf LP/B - HP/B
Average Average t-statistic
Number of Observations 579 577
Market Value 1 170 000 000 2 050 000 000 -5.08 ***
Total Assets 8 790 000 000 5 420 000 000 4.76 ***
Price Book 0.64x 1.79x -28.66 ***
CAPE 20.25x 22.63x 0.1
Return on Equity 9.13% 10.8% -12.61 ***
Stock Return(t) 2.21% 28% -11.08 ***
Stock Return(t+1) 7.8% 9.8% -1.13
(Future) Stock Return Volatility 0.23 0.36
Beta 0.837 0.997
Required Rate of Return 13.86% 14.98%
Abnormal Return -6.06% -5.18% -0.503
The key indicators are based on value weighted averages. Significance level is denoted as *** on a 2.5 %
significance level, ** on 5 % significance level and * on 10 % significance level. Number of observations
(company years) equals number of companies multiplied with number of years. Return on Equity is the
5 year moving average of ROE. Beta is calculated based on yearly correlation between portfolio and
market. Required rate of return is based on CAPM. The risk free rate is set to the 10- year government
bond yield.
vided in table 6.6, the future stock return is not significantly different between the two
value-weighted portfolios. However, as the normality of the return distribution can be
53
questioned, the results of the Wilcoxon rank-sum and median test is presented below.
For the value-weighted portfolios, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of both the
rank sum (Z-value of -0.152 and a p-value of 0.88) and the median test (p-value of 0.142).
Therefore, we can not assume that the two value-weighted portfolios obtain significantly
different future returns. Comparing these results to the results obtained from the two
equally-weighted portfolios, the return-predictability may seem to be concentrated in
smaller firms. This is in line with the findings from hypothesis 1.
6.2.3 Weaknesses and Robustness of the Analysis
Whether the excess return earned by investing in the equally-weighted low P/B portfolio
is strictly a small firm effect, can be examined more in debt creating additional portfolios
accounting for size or by size-adjusting the portfolio returns by using the same method as
Lakonishok et al. (1994). Næs et al. (2008) have also researched the size effect through a
similar approach. Their study finds the effect to be significant, where smaller firms have
experienced a higher stock return.
An additional weakness lies in the construction of our portfolios. The P/B ratio is based
on both market data and accounting information. However, as mentioned in subsection
4.4.3, financial statements of companies are typically not published until March/April the
subsequent year. As we only have year-end data available, our portfolios are consequently
constructed based on data that is only theoretically accessible at the time of construction.
Lastly, when comparing the risk-adjusted abnormal returns of the two portfolios, we
have only controlled for market (beta) risk. However, the future stock return could
also be affected by other (systematic) risk factors like size, liquidity and momentum.
Controlling for other risk factors that could explain parts of the excess abnormal return,
could strengthen the performed analysis and findings.
To check the robustness of our analysis, we have conducted the similar review and anal-
yses after winosorizing the sample, through limiting the outliers to the values of the 10
% percentiles of the stock returns. For both the equally-weighted and value-weighted
portfolios, the portfolio features are presented in table 9.7 in appendix. Similar to our
original analysis of the equally-weighted portfolios, the low P/B portfolio still obtains
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higher future return (14.1 % vs. 11.4 %) compared to the high P/B portfolio. The rank
sum test still proves a significant difference between the two returns (Z-value of -3 and
p-value of 0), but the median test do not (p-value of 0.68). The high P/B portfolio still
consists of larger stocks and obtained the better historical return (22.1 % vs. 1.9 %).
After winsorizing the value-weighted portfolios, there is still no significant difference be-
tween the future returns of the two portfolios based on the rank sum (Z = -0.182 and p =
0.86) and median test (p = 0.142). As we obtain the similar results as the original anal-
ysis, both for the equally- and value-weighted portfolios, our model is robust to outliers
and extreme observations.
In our analysis addressing hypothesis 2, we have only divided the included companies into
two portfolios. In contrast to earlier research, where authors have divided their sample
into up to 10 portfolios, these results are less nuanced where the two portfolios may have
more similar features, making it harder to obtain significant conclusions regarding the
future return. Exploiting 10 portfolios, instead of just two, would also able the analysis
to pick up non-linear effects.The robustness of our analysis may be somewhat weakened
due to this issue.
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7. Further Research
Even though our thesis is a valuable contribution to the historical research of the OSE,
our study is limited to analyzing approximately 60 % of the companies listed at OSE
for the time period 1961-1989. In order to strengthen the findings in this paper, an
aim could be to expand the data set by including all listed companies for each year.
Also, including the accounting information for companies back to 1881, when the first
listings at OSE started, would be of value. As annual market information for this entire
time period is already digitalized1, the supplement of accounting information will create
opportunities regarding analyzing different effects over longer time horizons. Also, it
would be interesting to expand the data set to also include historical levels of dividend
yields.
Furthermore, this thesis has sought to investigate the relationship between the P/B ratio
and future realized stock returns. Other research papers have also examined how ad-
ditional empirically motivated factors like size, liquidity and momentum correlate with
future market returns2. A similar analysis could also be interesting to perform for OSE
prior to 1980, to further investigate whether some of these factors significantly affect
variations in future market returns.
Our research is independent of the state of the economy. The analysis could be fur-
ther expanded by investigating whether macroeconomic variables actually are priced in
the Norwegian stock market before 1980. However, it should be emphasized that it is
challenging to prove a significant relationship between stock return and macroeconomic
variables, as the stock market also can be viewed as a leading indicator for the economy
(Næs et al., 2008).
1See Buer (2013)
2See for instance Næs et al. (2008), Fama and French (1992) and Lakonishok et al. (1994)
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8. Conclusion
This thesis has aimed to assemble a representative data set for OSE in the period 1961-
1989 in order to explore characteristics and provide deeper insights of the stock exchange
for the selected time period. As data concerning the financial statements of listed com-
panies has not been fully digitized1, little prior research have examined this time interval.
The collected accounting data has been supplemented with existing market values and
stock returns, and has provided interesting findings regarding the OSE.
Revisiting the characteristics description presented in chapter 5, the debt ratio slightly
increased through the 1960s and 1970s. Debt financing was especially attractive due to
a low interest rate policy, even though issuance of debt was strictly regulated. When the
companies’ retained earnings and the trading level at OSE increased in the beginning of
the 1980s, one should expect the debt ratio to decrease as equity became more accessible.
However, a more liberal credit policy also made debt more available, and the two effects
might somewhat have evened each other out.
The key measures ROE, P/B and P/E have also been explored, and as elaborated in
section 5.3, the indicators reflect the historical factors and events. Especially the year
1973, when the price of oil increased, is of interest. The ROE drops heavily in the
subsequent years, and the P/B and P/E values reach historical highs before they rapidly
fall the following year. In 1987, several international stock markets crashed, and the OSE
was especially affected as the crash coincided with an economic decline and bank crisis
in Norway. The three key indicators also grasp and reflect this period of time.
Furthermore, this thesis has aimed to examine the relationship between the P/B ratio
and future realized stock returns for OSE in 1961-1989. The analyses were based on two
approaches, defined in the hypotheses; i) A low (high) P/B ratio is associated with a
high (low) future long-term return and ii) Portfolios dominated by low P/B firms yield a
higher mean return than portfolios dominated by high P/B firms.
The examination of hypothesis 1 was performed by conducting conducting analyses both
1Financial information have been available for a share of our included companies for the time period
1980-89
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on market level and firm level. The market level analysis showed an inverse and significant
relationship between the market P/B and the 5-year future market return. The effect
was still significant after controlling for size (market value), risk (debt ratio), profitabil-
ity (ROE) and a 5-year lag of the abnormal long-term return. The firm level analysis
initially also supported that the contemporary P/B inversely affected the future 5-year
stock return. However, the significance of the P/B disappeared when controlling for
size (market value). Size has a significant negative effect on future stock returns. By
further studying the relationship between P/B and size like Banz (1981), we infer that
the P/B is a proxy for size. To investigate hypothesis 2, we constructed two portfolios;
one consisting of low P/B-firms and one consisting of high P/B-firms. We analyzed the
differences looking at both the equally-weighted and value-weighted construction of the
portfolios. For the equally-weighted portfolio, we found that the high P/B portfolio had
the highest portfolio return today (23.6 % vs. 4.9 % in the low P/B portfolio), while the
low P/B portfolio had a higher next year return (17.5 % in comparison with 11.8 %).
A Wilcoxon rank sum test concluded that the low P/B portfolio obtained a significantly
higher return compared to the high P/B portfolio. However, the median test failed to
prove the same significance, which introduces some uncertainty to the conclusion of the
rank sum test. To account for firm size differences in the two portfolios, we also analyzed
the value-weighted portfolios. In contrast with the equally-weighted portfolios, there is
no longer a significant difference in the future return. The findings may imply that the
abnormal return of the low P/B portfolio based on equally-weighted averages emerged
from the size effect. As the value-weighed portfolios are more affected by larger firms,
the findings may indicate that the stock return-predictability is concentrated in smaller
firms. These findings are also in line with what the assessment of hypothesis 1 showed.
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9. Appendix
Appendix to Chapter 5: Characteristics of the Oslo Stock Exchange
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Figure 9.6 – Development in Unadjusted P/B
The P/B ratio is computed based on unadjusted equity, i.e. equity without untaxed equity
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Appendix to Section 6.1: Hypothesis 1
Table 9.1 – Correlation Matrix
5YMR MPB 5YMRlag5 lnMV MDR MROE
5YMR 1.00
MPB -0.76 1.00
5YMRlag5 0.32 -0.28 1.00
lnMV -0.28 0.39 0.01 1.00
MDR 0.02 0.01 0.36 0.38 1.00
MROE -0.30 0.36 -0.31 0.29 -0.24 1.00
Correlation matrix for independent variables from the regression
analysis presented in table 6.1. 5YMR = Market 5-year future return,
MPB = Market P/B, 5YMRlag5 = 5-year lag of average 5-year mar-
ket return, MV = market value, MDR = Market debt ratio, MROE
= Market return on equity.
Table 9.2 – Augmented Dicky Fuller Test
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 23
Interpolated Dickey-Fuller
Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical
Statistic Value Value Value
Z(t) -4.625 -3.75 -3 -2.63
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0001
D.cw 5YSR Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
L1. -1.2887 0.2786447 -4.62 0 -1.87659 -0.70081
LD. 0.528435 0.2367642 2.23 0.039 0.028907 1.027964
L2D. 0.584912 0.2240361 2.61 0.018 0.112238 1.057587
L3D. 0.634432 0.206909 3.07 0.007 0.197892 1.070971
L4D. 0.607272 0.186822 3.25 0.005 0.213112 1.001432
cons 0.008771 0.0150956 0.58 0.569 -0.02308 0.04062
Augmented Dicky Fuller test ran for the aggregate level time series analysis in
equation 6.3 in section 6.1. Four lags are included, decided through analyzing
the ACF (autocorrelation function) and PACF (partial autocorrelation function)
of the series. A Z-value of -3.74 provides the p-value of 0. Thus, we can dismiss
the null hypothesis stating that there is a unit root in our series.
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Table 9.3 – Fisher-type Unit Root Test
Fisher-type unit-root test for abn5YSR
Based on Phillips-Perron tests
Ho: All panels contain unit roots Number of panels = 55
Ha: At least one panel is stationary Avg. number of periods = 18.15
AR parameter: Panel-specific Asymptotics: T -¿ Infinity
Panel means: Included
Time trend: Included
Newey-West lags: 3 lags
Statistic p-value
Inverse chi-squared(110) P 176.2202 0.0001
Inverse normal Z 0.5068 0.6938
Inverse logit t(274) L* -0.9328 0.1759
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm Pm 4.4646 0
P statistic requires number of panels to be finite.
Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels.
A Fisher-type unit-root test is ran for the series of abn5YSR. We include a trend-variable.
Therefore, the null hypothesis states that we have trend-stationarity in our series. As we
obtain a p-value of 0 (using the Z-statistics of 0.507), we can reject the null hypothesis. The
panel is trend-stationary and we need to include trend term(s) to be able to correctly make
statistical inference.
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Table 9.4 – Regression Results: Size Proxy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
abn5YSR abn5YSR abn5YSR abn5YSR
abn5YSRlag5 -0.0284 -0.0299 -0.00037 -0.0299
lnMV -0.114∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗
PB 0.0016 -0.0786∗∗∗ 0.0016
t 0.0023 0.0019 -0.00069 0.0019
t2 0.0006∗ 0.0006∗ 0.0003 0.0006∗
cons 1.953∗∗∗ 1.944∗∗∗ 0.0664∗ 1.944∗∗∗
N 667 659 659 659
Significance level denoted as: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
abn5YSR = abnormal 5-year stock return, abn5YSRlag5 = 5-year lag of the abnormal long-
term return, MV= market value, t/t2 = trend variables.
69
Robustness Tests: Hypothesis 1
Table 9.5 – Robustness Test: Market Level Analysis
(1) (2) (3)
5YMR 5YMR 5YMR





Constant 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.274
Observations 28 28 28
R-squared 0.117 0.119 0.349
Significance level denoted as: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Market level Analysis based on equally-weighted variables. 5YMR
= Market 5-year future return, MPB = Market P/B, 5YMRlag = 5-
year lag of average 5-year market return, MV = market value, MDR
= Market debt ratio, MROE = Market return on equity.
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Number of groups 54
Adjusted R-squared 0.297
Significance level denoted as:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The outliers are set to the 10%-percentiles. abn5YSR = Ab-
normal 5-year future stock return, abn5YSRlag5 = 5-year lag
of abnormal 5-year stock return, MV = Market value, ROE =
Retrun on equity, DR= Debt ratio, t/t2 = Trendvariables.
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Appendix to Section 6.2: Hypothesis 2 - Equally-Weighted Portfolios
Figure 9.7 – Equally-weighted Portfolio P/B
Development in equally-weighted yearly P/B for the low- and high P/B portfolio presented in Table 6.5. The portfolios
are rebalanced every year.
Figure 9.8 – Contemporary portfolio return for the low- and high P/B equally-weighted portfolios
Development in contemporary portfolio return for the low- and high P/B equally-weighted portfolio presented in Table
6.5. The portfolios are rebalanced every year.
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Figure 9.9 – Next years portfolio return for the low- and high P/B equally-weighted portfolios
Development in next year portfolio return for the low- and high P/B equally-weighted portfolio presented in Table 6.5.
The portfolios are rebalanced every year.
Figure 9.10 – Average market value for the low- and high P/B equally-weighted portfolios
Development in equally-weighted average in market value for the low- and high P/B portfolio presented in Table 6.5. The
portfolios are rebalanced every year.
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Figure 9.11 – Equally-weighted average ROE of the low- and high P/B portfolios










1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Year
Low P/B Portfolio PB High P/B Portfolio PB
Development in PB for value-weighted low- and high P/B portfolio presented in table 6.6. The portfolios are rebalanced
every year.















1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Year
Low P/B Portfolio High P/B Portfolio
Development in contemporaneous return for the value-weighted low- and high P/B portfolio presented in table 6.6. The
portfolios are rebalanced every year.
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1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Year
Next Year Return for Low P/B Portfolio Next Year Return for High P/B Portfolio
Development in next year return for the value-weighted low- and high P/B portfolio presented in table 6.6. The portfolios
are rebalanced every year.





1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Year
High P/B Portfolio MV Low P/B Portfolio Mv
Development in market value for value-weighted low- and high P/B portfolio presented in table 6.6. The portfolios are
rebalanced every year.
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Table 9.7 – Robustness Test: Winsorized Portfolio Analysis
Equally-weighted portfolios
Low P/B portfolio
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Portfolio Return (t) 579 0.02 0.15 - 0.25 0.20
Portfolio Return (t+1) 579 0.14 0.20 - 0.15 0.45
Market Value 579 252,000,000.00 399,000,000.00 29,600,000.00 1,210,000,000.00
Total Assets 579 3,210,000,000.00 5,030,000,000.00 236,000,000.00 16,500,000,000.00
PB 579 0.59 0.17 0.34 0.86
CAPE 579 14.64 22.69 - 0.81 79.23
ROE 579 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.14
High P/B portfolio
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Portfolio Return (t) 577 0.22 0.29 - 0.13 0.76
Portfolio Return (t+1) 577 0.11 0.26 - 0.27 0.63
Market Value 577 385,000,000.00 348,000,000.00 82,200,000.00 1,140,000,000.00
Total Assets 577 1,570,000,000.00 1,210,000,000.00 429,000,000.00 3,750,000,000.00
PB 577 1.40 0.46 0.87 2.20
CAPE 577 10.90 4.90 4.19 19.26
ROE 577 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.16
Value-weighted portfolios
Low P/B portfolio
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Portfolio Return (t) 579 0.01 0.19 - 0.33 0.32
Portfolio Return (t+1) 579 0.07 0.19 - 0.20 0.37
Market Value 579 902,000,000.00 1,670,000,000.00 66,300,000.00 5,080,000,000.00
PB 579 0.63 0.19 0.40 0.99
CAPE 579 11.10 8.79 1.67 30.52
ROE 579 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.13
High P/B portfolio
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Portfolio Return (t) 577 0.23 0.33 - 0.19 0.85
Portfolio Return (t+1) 577 0.07 0.25 - 0.33 0.58
Market Value 577 970,000,000.00 1,670,000,000.00 66,300,000.00 5,080,000,000.00
PB 577 1.70 0.65 0.98 2.86
CAPE 577 18.85 8.70 7.79 33.85
ROE 577 0.11 0.01 0.09 0.13
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Summary Statistics - Equally-weighted and value-weighted Portfolios
Table 9.8 – Summary Statistics Low P/B Portfolio
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Observations 494
Stock Return (t) 0.04 0.15 - 0.20 0.43
Stock Return (t+1) 0.08 0.14 - 0.13 0.42
Market Value 363,000,000 715,000,000 19,300,000 3,450,000,000
Total Assets 4,680,000,000 8,440,000,000 118,000,000 30,800,000,000
Price Book 0.61 0.18 0.32 1.02
Price Earnings 17.94 170.71 - 633.29 597.39
Return on Equity 0.07 0.10 - 0.30 0.18
Key indicators based on equally-weighted averages. # of Observations (com-
pany years) equals number of companies multiplied with number of years.
Table 9.9 – Summary Statistics High P/B Portfolio
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Observations 473
Stock Return (t) 0.13 0.19 - 0.15 0.54
Stock Return (t+1) 0.08 0.15 - 0.15 0.43
Market Value 477,000,000 880,000,000 47,300,000 5,870,000,000
Total Assets 2,060,000,000 2,490,000,000 402,000,000 14,300,000,000
Price Book 1.45 0.67 0.70 3.90
Price Earnings 27.08 65.51 1.41 314.79
Return on Equity 0.26 1.03 - 0.27 6.63
Key indicators based on equally-weighted averages. # of Observations (com-
pany years) equals number of companies multiplied with number of years.
Data Construction
The following pages includes an excerpt of our assembled data set. The entire data set
is available upon request.
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Table 9.10 – P/B, 1961-1970
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Industry Companies
Actinor/Norgas
Aker Mek. Verksted 0.84 0.78 0.70 0.81 0.72 0.45 0.47 0.57 1.16 1.65
Borregaard 0.74 0.38 0.33 0.36 0.56 0.52
Christiania Spigerverk 1.60 1.15 1.07 1.17 1.13 1.00 1.15 2.66 1.76 1.75
D.N.L/ SAS 1.20 1.14 0.73
Dyno 0.91 0.73 0.79 0.91 0.60 1.11 1.34 1.78 2.13 1.51
Elektrisk Bureau 0.77 1.16 0.95 0.80 0.53 0.51 0.78 1.41 1.71 1.88
Elektrokemisk 1.35 1.01 1.01 1.14 1.42 1.54 1.72 1.81 2.17 1.96
Follum Fabrikker 1.13 0.83 0.85 0.72 0.74 0.54 0.54 0.46 0.71 0.63
Hafslund 1.24 1.09 1.11 1.13 1.01 0.90 1.13 0.96 1.21 1.04
Investa 1.16 1.13 1.01 0.94 1.10 1.30 1.13
Jonas Øglænd 0.81 0.91 0.84 0.81
Kværner 0.63 0.74 0.84 1.22 1.47 0.87 0.97 1.18 1.36 1.26
Norcem 0.66 0.53 0.44
Norema
Norsk Data A
Norsk Hydro 1.69 0.74 1.24 1.35 1.19 0.92 0.76 0.73 0.75 1.50
Norske Skog 0.84 0.46 0.48 1.35 1.11
Orkla 0.91 0.72 0.75 0.78 0.83 0.82 0.82 1.30 1.64 6.11
Saga Petroleum
Saugbrugsforeningen 1.11 0.93 1.04 1.00 0.69 0.62 0.57 0.42 0.94 0.78
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P/B 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Sydvaranger 0.86 1.03 0.90
Viking-Askim 0.28 0.24 0.24 0.52 0.40 0.34 0.77 0.53 0.94
Banking Companies
Bergen Bank
Bergen Kredittbank 1.18 1.06 1.06 1.03 0.99 0.84 0.69 0.88 0.85 0.81
Bergen Privatbank 0.96 0.87 0.23 0.26 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.64 0.65
Christiania Bank og Kreidtt 1.14 0.90 0.92 0.88 0.83 0.73 0.69 0.72 0.79 0.66
Den norske Credtikasse 1.27 1.07 0.95 0.90 0.90 0.77 0.68 0.82 0.88 0.77
Forretningsbanken 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.86 0.84 0.83 0.81 0.81
Shipping Companies
Atlantica 0.94 0.69 0.55 0.69 0.43 0.60 0.67 0.42 0.49 0.84
Beamont 1.08 0.93 0.90 0.76 0.65 0.68 0.83 0.82 0.80 2.77
Belships 0.78 0.60 0.76 0.93 0.95 1.06 1.10 0.86 1.00 2.04
Bergehus 1.84 1.93 1.84 1.73 1.62 1.57 1.77 3.20
Billabong
Bruusgaard 1.18 0.95 1.01 0.64 0.71 0.55 0.46 0.49 0.38 1.57
Det Bergenske DS 0.67 0.56 0.62 0.64 0.62 0.54 0.48 0.45 0.45 0.61
Det Nordenfjelske DS 0.77 0.78 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.83 0.71 0.66 0.67 0.70
Den Norske Amerikalinje 1.06 0.94 0.97 0.89 0.86 0.71 0.53 0.55 0.56 0.79
Den Norske Afrika Og Australialinje 1.17 0.78 0.87 0.74 0.67 0.60 0.54 0.49 0.48 1.17
Ganger Rolf 0.70 0.57 0.56 0.54 0.49 0.50 0.43 0.33 0.34 0.51
Hadrian 0.54 0.69 0.63 0.59 0.21 0.22 0.44 0.36 0.35
Ivarans Rederi 1.02 0.88 0.99 0.95 0.77 0.64 0.52 0.65 0.72 0.72
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P/B 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Kosmos 0.87 0.84 1.17 1.11 0.95 0.85 1.03 1.13 1.40 2.47
Mascot 0.75 0.57 0.49 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.35 0.42 0.44 0.85
Nordheim 0.92 0.76 0.77 0.60 0.56 0.50 0.31 0.33 0.35 1.23
Pelagos 0.93 0.72 0.74 0.67 0.66 0.59 0.54 1.55 0.67 1.50
Sigmalm 1.05 0.82 0.97 1.55 1.38 1.87
Wilhelmsens 1.82 1.23 1.18 1.12 0.93 0.86 0.80 0.80 0.68 1.60
Ørnen 0.80 0.53 0.65 0.70 0.66 0.72 0.71 0.79 0.96 2.07
Insurance Companies
Storebrand 0.94 0.92 0.94 0.95 0.37 0.32 0.29 0.38 0.48 0.57
Vesta 1.29 1.17 1.45 1.40 1.03 0.88 0.95 1.11 1.25 1.19
Arendals Forsikringsselskap 0.71 0.70 0.85 0.89 1.08 0.99 0.98 2.12 1.28 1.36
Norden, Forsiktrings-Aktieselskapet 0.55 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.56 0.49 0.46 0.61 0.60 0.77
Nordengruppen
Trondhjems Fr.(Forenedegruppen)
EqW Average 0.99 0.85 0.87 0.88 0.80 0.74 0.73 0.87 0.94 1.32
CapW Average 1.29 0.87 0.98 1.06 0.96 0.82 0.85 1.14 1.22 1.61
Median 0.94 0.81 0.86 0.88 0.77 0.73 0.69 0.78 0.81 1.08
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Table 9.11 – P/B, 1971-1980
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Industry Companies
Actinor/Norgas 1.06 1.56 1.50 1.73 1.46 0.99 0.46 0.86 0.85 1.89
Aker Mek. Verksted 1.24 1.02 1.96 1.30 0.46 0.33 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.23
Borregaard 0.35 0.37 0.46 0.30 0.41 0.30 0.16 0.20 0.15 0.25
Christiania Spigerverk 1.13
D.N.L/SAS 0.61 0.71 0.63 0.50 0.40 0.37 0.39 0.16 0.38 0.37
Dyno 1.24 1.60 1.50 0.80 1.09 1.06 0.74 0.74 0.83 0.94
Elektrisk Bureau 1.06 1.02 1.07 0.73 0.75 0.76 0.53 0.53 0.48 0.40
Elektrokemisk 1.26 1.27 1.57 1.06 0.73 0.73 0.30 0.48 0.56 0.49
Follum Fabrikker 0.49 0.57 0.83 0.61 0.60 0.61 0.40 0.43 0.61 0.46
Hafslund 1.10 1.31 1.48 1.05 1.20 0.90 0.61 0.88 0.98 0.76
Investa 0.84 0.82 0.80 0.72 0.57 0.44 0.33 0.23 0.42 0.43
Jonas Øglænd 0.80 0.62 0.51 0.48 0.42 0.23 0.57 0.36 0.34 0.45
Kværner 1.15 1.11 1.19 0.92 0.58 0.40 0.25 0.29 0.37 0.56
Norcem 0.42 0.47 0.62 0.53 0.46 0.68 0.55 0.46 0.38 0.38
Norema 0.59 0.70 0.41 0.32 0.40 0.38 0.40 0.38 0.19
Norsk Data A 2.83 1.60 0.29 0.56 0.77 0.10 5.12
Norsk Hydro 2.66 2.59 6.98 1.69 1.66 1.22 0.77 0.72 2.70 2.07
Norske Skog 1.05 0.22 1.00 0.93 0.74 0.68 0.48 0.46 0.46 0.47
Orkla 1.44 1.20 1.19 1.00 0.76 0.90 0.44 0.48 0.76 0.63
Saga Petroleum 3.48 3.81
Saugbrugsforeningen 0.60 0.61 0.71 0.50 0.55 0.58 0.30 0.42
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P/B 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Sydvaranger 0.78 0.95 1.08 0.57 0.62 0.41 0.14 0.15 0.41 0.61
Viking-Askim 0.61 0.75 0.76 0.44 0.35 0.40 0.10 0.07 0.13 0.18
Banking Companies
Bergen Bank 0.62 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.61
Bergen Kredittbank 0.81 0.81 0.79 0.80
Bergen Privatbank 0.65 0.74
Christiania Bank og Kreidtt 0.75 0.86 0.85 0.67 0.74 0.68 0.69 0.57 0.57 0.62
Den norske Credtikasse 0.74 0.75 0.83 0.65 0.68 0.72 0.60 0.60 0.62
Forretningsbanken 0.78 0.86 0.82 0.72 0.73 0.77 0.66 0.63 0.68
Shipping Companies
Atlantica 0.51 0.67 0.98 0.36 0.39 0.38 0.42 0.45 0.77 0.77
Beamont 3.04 2.12 1.70 1.01 0.85 1.25 1.92 1.62
Belships 0.70 1.83 0.97 1.54 0.68 0.39 0.24 1.24
Bergehus 2.27 2.18 1.46 1.83 1.31 1.73 1.23 0.95 1.10
Billabong 0.78 0.93 0.85 0.81 1.00 0.62 0.65 0.75 0.74 0.87
Bruusgaard 0.85 0.70 0.65
Det Bergense DS 0.56 0.59 0.57 0.47 0.36 0.56 0.58 0.77 0.43 0.72
Det Nordenfjeldske DS 0.72 0.97 1.52 1.06 1.03 0.57 0.48 0.53 0.83 1.16
Den Norske Amerikalinje 0.49 0.68 0.90 0.78 0.44 0.51 0.73 0.62 1.16 1.12
Den Norske Afrika Og Australialinje 0.75 0.45 0.62 0.37 0.25 0.30 0.26 0.47 0.58 0.48
Ganger Rolf 0.43 0.52 0.46 0.34 0.17 0.28 0.25 0.17 0.28 0.75
Hadrian 3.31 3.95 5.07 1.05 0.62
Ivarans Rederi 0.50 0.49 0.68 0.35 0.28 0.41 0.37 0.35 0.74 0.36
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P/B 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Kosmos 1.49 1.38 1.42 0.95 0.70 1.02 0.58 0.42 0.88 0.70
Mascot 0.49 0.97 0.73 0.32 0.20 0.41 0.28 0.24 0.22 0.18
Nordheim 1.10 0.71 1.76 0.68 0.31 0.65 0.30
Pelagos 2.72 1.45 1.78 1.52 0.33 0.66 0.12 0.15 0.11
Sigmalm 1.55 1.57 0.93 0.74 0.81 1.09 0.97 0.96 1.12
Wilhelmsens 1.42 0.76 0.75 0.39 0.27 0.26 0.23 0.39 0.41 0.35
Ørnen 1.70 1.81 2.90 1.32 0.64 0.84 0.35 0.69 1.80
Insurance Companies
Storebrand 0.43 1.12 1.19 0.89 0.74 0.71 0.46 0.41 0.64 0.73
Vesta 0.96 0.98 0.86 0.80 0.70 0.65 0.51 0.46 0.66 0.84
Arendals Forsikringsselskap 2.07 1.77 2.36 2.77
Norden, Forsikrings-Aktieselskapet
Nordengruppen 0.76 0.70 0.70 0.76 0.76 0.64 0.53 0.55
Trondhjems Fr.(Forenedegruppen)
EqW Average 1.08 1.09 1.27 0.90 0.67 6.64 0.50 0.53 0.66 0.90
CapW Average 1.56 1.54 4.26 1.17 1.09 0.91 0.64 0.61 1.94 1.82
Median 0.81 0.93 0.90 0.76 0.62 0.64 0.46 0.47 0.56 0.63
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Table 9.12 – P/B, 1981-1989
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Industry Companies
Actinor/Norgas 2.22 1.04 1.41 2.28 2.85
Aker Mek. Verksted 0.20 1.55
Borregaard 0.52 0.35 0.69 0.84
Christiania Spigerverk
D.N.L/SAS 0.26 0.60 3.13 2.12 2.18 2.11 1.03 0.69 1.44
Dyno 0.93 0.62 1.87 1.51 1.43 0.90 1.16 1.41 1.57
Elektrisk Bureau 0.64 0.60 1.37 1.05 1.30 1.15 1.24 1.08 1.39
Elektrokemisk 0.45 0.51 0.80 0.72 0.73 0.47 1.18 0.66
Follum Fabrikker 0.73 0.58 1.47 2.70
Hafslund 0.92 1.02 1.89 1.82 2.84 2.84 5.99 5.85 2.02
Investa 0.53 0.47 0.62 1.60 0.67 0.91 1.19 1.63 1.71
Jonas Øglænd 0.75 0.79 0.99 1.21 1.78 1.86 2.79 1.75
Kværner 1.12 0.75 0.73 1.49 1.51 1.37 1.39 1.72 1.43
Norcem 0.55 0.46 0.78 1.44 1.91
Norema 0.23 0.64 1.16 1.25 1.63 1.96 1.65
Norsk Data A 15.25 3.96 5.25 4.98 2.95 2.28 0.83 0.84 0.85
Norsk Hydro 1.45 0.96 1.10 0.85 1.13 1.07 1.23 1.40 1.83
Norske Skog 0.29 0.31 0.75 0.84 0.55 0.64 0.56 0.52 1.57
Orkla 0.29 0.41 1.15 1.51 0.67 1.65 1.44 1.73 1.71
Saga Petroleum 2.17 1.57 1.58 1.37 1.06 0.67 0.87 1.12 1.30
Saugbrugsforeningen
86
P/B 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Sydvaranger 0.23 0.12 0.06 0.05
Viking-Askim 0.11 0.09 0.49 0.54 3.88 2.53
Banking Companies
Bergen Bank 1.43 1.15 0.78 0.41 0.54
Bergen Kredittbank
Bergen Privatbank
Christiania Bank og Kreidtt 0.63 0.58 0.79 0.78 0.82 0.93 0.67 0.68 0.79
Den norske Credtikasse 0.81 0.69 0.84 0.30
Forretningsbanken
Shipping Companies
Atlantica 1.63 0.93 2.14 16.45 1.92
Beamont
Belships 1.41 0.88 2.48 0.42 0.51 0.51
Bergehus 0.93 1.39 1.67 2.03
Billabong 0.92 0.54 0.83 0.86
Bruusgaard 1.45 0.74 0.44
Det Bergense DS 0.81 0.29 0.94 1.44
Det Nordenfjeldske DS 0.75 0.67 1.47 1.82
Den Norske Amerikalinje 3.75 0.42 0.81 1.26 2.67 1.56 2.00 1.95 2.04
Den Norske Afrika Og Australialinje
Ganger Rolf 1.47 0.55 1.36 1.94 1.10 1.00 0.70 3.36
Hadrian
Ivarans Rederi 0.71 0.80 1.24 1.09 1.60 1.11 1.36 2.15
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P/B 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Kosmos 0.72 0.76 1.16 2.59 2.09 1.57 1.12 1.85 1.49
Mascot 0.07 0.83 0.47 0.19
Nordheim
Pelagos
Sigmalm 1.39 1.76 1.43 1.79
Wilhelmsens 1.80 0.84 1.76 0.99 0.95 1.18 2.12 4.66 2.91
Ørnen 2.18 1.52 2.02 3.41
Insurance Companies
Storebrand 1.21 0.90 1.06 1.25 2.00 1.65 1.82 2.27 3.30




Trondhjems Fr.(Forenedegruppen) 1.29 1.43 4.14 2.07 2.90 4.15 2.19 2.63
EqW Average 1.39 0.82 1.38 1.59 2.17 1.39 1.47 1.76 1.59
CapW Average 2.56 1.08 1.61 1.87 1.63 1.36 1.68 1.80 1.71
Median 0.78 0.74 1.16 1.44 1.62 1.15 1.19 1.52 1.53
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Table 9.13 – Stock Returns 1961-1970
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Industry Companies
Actinor/Norgas
Akers Mek -4.8% -10.0% -6.9% 19.4% 27.5% -21.6% 22.5% 73.7% 81.2%
Borregaard -18.4% 9.6% 35.1% -3.2%
Christiania Spigerverk 19.1% -23.5% 0.2% 18.3% 22.5% 30.3% 150.7% -23.4% 17.8%
D.N.L/SAS
Dyno 20.0% -21.6% 10.0% 20.5% 9.4% -11.2% 45.6% 47.4% 25.6% -32.4%
Elektrisk Bureau 30.0% 7.9% 13.4% -3.2% 8.9% 10.2% 88.9% 95.2% 18.7% 19.9%
Elektrokemisk 28.2% -20.5% -1.9% 25.2% 29.5% 28.4% 14.2% 49.0% 34.8% 7.1%
Follum Fabrikker -11.9% -30.5% 3.7% -17.6% -14.3% -23.3% -17.4% 2.6% 61.5% -13.6%
Hafslund 10.6% -12.3% 1.6% 1.5% -3.0% -9.4% 8.4% -2.7% 40.7% 3.3%
Investa -7.1% -3.8% 33.3% 28.0% 31.2%
Jonas Øglænd




Norsk Hydro 27.0% -52.8% 66.7% 11.8% -8.7% -20.4% -19.4% -5.2% 3.0% 113.2%
Norske Skog 180.0% -7.1%
Orkla 12.2% -18.4% 8.3% -1.5% 6.2% 4.4% 31.5% 73.2% 26.8% 23.9%
Saga Petroleum
Saugbrugsforeningen -4.0% -18.9% 7.8% -6.0% -15.4% -16.0% -8.0% -28.3% 127.9% -16.2%
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Stock Returns 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Sydvaranger -9.3%
Viking-Askim -13.0% -2.5% 12.8% 63.6% 60.0% -2.8% -2.9% 34.6% 21.3%
Banking Companies
Bergens Bank
Bergens Kreditbank 23.0% -9.3% -1.5% 19.4% -12.5% 1.8% 21.1% -2.2% 35.6%
Bergens Privatbank 9.2% -18.0% -1.2% -2.3% -6.8% -8.7% -3.5% 2.2% -2.9% -1.4%
Christiania Bank og Kreditkasse 33.4% -1.8% 9.5% 0.9% -1.9% -1.6% -3.5% 7.2% 18.5% -12.4%
Den norske Creditbank 13.2% -11.6% -3.3% -0.3% 6.3% -10.6% -4.2% 15.3% 8.6% -5.3%
Forretningsbanken 3.4% 89.8% -70.2% 2.0% -2.0% -4.0% -0.8% -1.9% 2.6%
Shipping Companies
Atlantica 3.3% -19.4% -5.0% 1.1% -16.7% -2.5% 15.4% -13.3% 2.6% 137.5%
Beamont -15.5% -16.7% -6.0% -10.6% 23.8% 11.5% 6.9% 383.9%
Belships 3.8% -25.9% 25.0% 4.0% -3.8% 4.0% -12.3% 12.3% 134.4%
Bergehus 21.7% -7.1% 11.5% -1.7% -5.3% 1.9% 25.5% 7.2% 123.0%
Billabong
Bruusgard -4.9% -25.9% -4.7% -17.1% 4.4% -18.3% -8.6% -3.8% 2.0% 319.6%
Det Bergenske Ds -15.2% 3.6% -1.7% -12.3% -18.0% -2.4% 2.5% 30.7%
Det Nordenfjeldske Ds 17.2% 1.0% 5.2% -4.9% -3.4% -8.9% -15.7% -4.7% 35.2% 6.1%
Den Norske Amerikalinje -5.5% -21.2% 2.4% -9.5% -1.3% -17.3% -27.4% 8.9% 26.5% 37.1%
Den Norske Afrika Og Australialinje -29.4% 5.6% -2.6% 8.1% 18.0% 103.4%
Ganger Rolf 1.6% -20.0% 1.9% -1.9% -7.7% -4.2% -4.3% -1.1% -3.4% 78.6%
Hadrian 25.0% -10.0% -14.8% 45.5% 200.0% 6.7% 25.0%
Ivarans Rederi -21.6% 10.3% -4.7% -11.5% -3.7% -15.4% 11.4% 3.7% 14.2%
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Stock Returns 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Kosmos -1.9% -0.6% 23.6% 26.8% 20.3% 108.1%
Mascot 2.2% -12.1% 3.1% 3.0% -1.2% 4.2% -8.6% -19.9% 79.4% 56.3%
Nordheim 6.1% -22.1% 5.3% -20.0% -7.5% -10.8% 9.1% 12.5% 9.9% 259.6%
Pelagos -15.3% -28.0% -4.2% -5.8% 4.6% -23.5% 5.8% 216.4% -45.4% 157.9%
Sigmalm -14.3% 33.3% 73.3% 174.3% 55.6%
Wilhelmsens -32.1% -1.9% 3.8% -3.7% -1.9% 2.0% 19.2% 4.4% 118.2%
Ørnen 61.5% -31.8% 13.8% 9.1% -8.3% 1.5% 4.5% 14.3% 125.0%
Insurance Companies
Storebrand 6.4% 0.3% 2.4% 3.5% 0.1% -13.9% 4.8% 41.5% 37.5% 29.3%
Vesta 26.5% -0.8% 163.9% -1.3% -9.3% -16.2% 9.8% 17.5% 14.9% 10.6%
Arendals Forsikringsselskap 4.5% 153.6% -35.2% 6.5% 8.2% -7.5% 2.0% 126.5% -37.0% 10.3%
Norden, Forsikrings-Aktieselskapet 12.7% 1.6% 5.6% 5.3% -8.1% -14.3% 2.4% 57.0% -1.9% 32.1%
Nordengruppen
Trondhjems Fr.(Forenedegruppen)
EqW Average 11.6% -7.8% 7.0% 2.6% 3.2% -6.0% 13.2% 26.7% 27.0% 58.9%
CapW Average 16.0% -21.6% 21.6% 6.3% 0.7% -5.4% 6.2% 35.7% 26.7% 49.9%
Median 9.2% -16.7% 3.1% 0.3% -1.7% -8.8% 1.9% 11.5% 18.2% 26.6%
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Table 9.14 – Stock Returns, 1971-1980
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Industry Companies
Actinor/Norgas 16.8% 27.5% -11.8% -22.2% -24.6% 43.4% 28.3% 72.2%
Akers Mek -11.5% -9.8% 111.2% 13.9% -62.1% -20.0% -54.5% 25.0% 20.0%
Borregaard -33.6% 6.1% 31.4% -8.7% -7.2% -7.3% -41.2% 18.3% 2.8% 6.2%
Christiania Spigerverk -25.5% -4.9%
D.N.L/SAS -16.8% 16.7% -17.0% -20.0% -18.8% -7.7% 15.0% -13.0% -16.7%
Dyno 8.2% 25.0% -36.2% 27.3% 2.8% -19.2% -9.1% 18.9% 14.3%
Elektrisk Bureau -40.0% 2.9% 13.0% -14.2% 15.7% 10.2% -19.2% 7.7% -5.1% 2.4%
Elektrokemisk -35.9% -7.7% 25.0% -22.2% -18.3% 11.9% -59.9% 55.1% 35.6% -18.6%
Follum Fabrikker -25.5% 11.4% 33.3% -11.5% -1.7% 1.8% -21.7% 8.3% 16.9% -26.1%
Hafslund 16.2% 18.6% 19.6% -14.8% 28.6% -2.1% -35.1% 37.7% 14.3% -13.5%
Investa -23.8% -27.5% -8.6% -26.4% -23.1% 66.7% 40.0%
Jonas Øglænd 12.5% 27.8% 31.5% -20.0% 42.9% -32.7% 11.4% 48.7%
Kværner -3.2% -11.7% 34.1% -14.3% -14.6% -15.9% -9.1% 25.0% 48.6% 19.0%
Norcem -1.1% 8.5% 12.9% -16.7% -12.0% 2.7% -9.8% 5.7% -19.2% -7.8%
Norema -9.7% 19.0% -32.6% -25.0% 33.3% -6.3% -33.3% 35.0%
Norsk Data -38.4% -20.6% 40.7% 18.4% 111.1% -66.2%
Norsk Hydro 94.2% 3.9% 167.1% -58.3% -13.5% -25.5% -9.9% 280.6% -6.4%
Norske Skog -11.5% 44.4% 24.0% -25.8% 4.3% -16.7% 41.2%
Orkla -33.9% -11.9% 18.9% -33.6% 2.7% -48.0% 23.1% 108.3% -6.0%
Saga Petroleum
Saugbrugsforeningen -24.4% 1.7% 19.8% -19.0% 6.4% -8.0% -53.0% 62.0% 8.6% -26.3%
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Stock Returns 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Sydvaranger -15.5% 19.5% 6.1% -33.6% 2.1% -30.6% -64.7% -8.3% 36.4% -36.0%
Viking-Askim -31.9% -0.8% 72.4% -47.4% -26.7% 23.6% -52.2% -23.1% 100.0% 55.0%
Banking Companies
Bergens Bank -11.3% 7.0% 1.4% 25.0%
Bergens Kreditbank 3.3% 3.2% -1.5%
Bergens Privatbank 1.3% 7.0% 6.4% -18.5%
Christiania Bank og Kreditkasse 1.4% 10.7% -1.0% -21.4% 13.1% -2.4% -0.7% 0.4% 5.2% 53.7%
Den norske Creditbank -2.4% 4.2% 11.5% -18.5% 7.7% 8.1% -7.6% 3.5% 5.7% -3.7%
Forretningsbanken 10.7% -1.6% -4.0% 2.7% 4.6% -8.8% -2.9% 10.4% 1.8%
Shipping Companies
Atlantica -36.8% 33.3% 37.5% -27.3% -18.8% 19.2% -12.9% 18.5% 68.8% 18.5%
Beamont 48.0% -16.2% 35.5% -8.3% -54.5% 40.0% 7.1% -41.3% 40.9% -59.7%
Belships -13.3% 30.8% -5.9% -6.3% -60.0% -41.7% -42.9% -35.0% 150.0% 23.1%
Bergehus -5.5% 38.5% -7.4% -28.0% 33.3% -27.1% -14.3% 41.7% -5.9%
Billabong 16.7% 4.8% 9.1% 4.2% -24.0% -15.8% 12.5% 11.1% 15.0%
Bruusgard -30.0% -9.5% -5.3% 2.8% -32.4% -10.0% 2.2% -17.4% -21.1%
Det Bergenske Ds -10.4% 6.2% -17.6% -19.0% -37.6% 22.6% 7.7% 278.6% 126.4%
Det Nordenfjeldske Ds 4.8% 15.5% 49.1% -17.1% -15.9% -44.1% -12.5% 14.3% 100.0% 87.5%
Den Norske Amerikalinje -41.2% 34.0% 49.3% -14.0% -37.2% 33.3% -25.0% -11.1% 91.7% -2.2%
Den Norske Afrika Og Australialinje -41.7% -14.3% 41.7% -20.6% -37.0% 35.3% -21.7% 11.1% 26.0%
Ganger Rolf -33.3% 32.0% 51.5% -45.0% -45.5% 40.0% -14.3% -25.0% 88.9% 233.3%
Hadrian 9.8% 74.3% -76.4% -41.2% 32.0% -54.5% -6.7% 50.0%
Ivarans Rederi -31.0% -23.0% 63.6% -4.8% -16.7% -20.0% -12.5% -28.6% 100.0% 20.0%
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Stock Returns 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Kosmos -16.9% 23.4% 26.6% -37.5% -23.2% 15.6% -40.5% -33.3% 127.3% -15.0%
Mascot -46.7% 87.5% 10.0% -56.4% -44.4% 37.5% -63.6% -10.0%
Nordheim -37.5% 5.0% 90.5% -50.0% -80.0% 25.0% -68.0%
Pelagos -18.4% -6.2% 53.3% -13.0% -77.5% 11.1% -46.0% 18.5% -76.6%
Sigmalm -16.1% 29.8% -8.2% -28.6% 40.0% -19.6% -2.2% 22.7% -18.5%
Wilhelmsens -33.3% -20.0% 12.5% -33.3% -33.3% 25.0% -25.0% 13.3% 17.6%
Ørnen -16.7% 3.3% 67.7% -48.1% -55.6% 43.3% -70.9% 12.0%
Insurance Companies
Storebrand -11.7% -1.4% 11.5% -26.4% -10.6% -5.6% -31.9% -4.9% 40.2% 19.0%
Vesta -10.3% 11.5% -5.3% -4.0% -11.1% -4.3% -25.5% -5.5% 36.8% 23.5%
Arendals Forsikringsselskap 56.3% 3.5% 54.6% -25.0% -50.0%
Norden, Forsikrings-Aktieselskapet
Nordengruppen -4.5% -7.8% -1.7% -13.8% -17.6% -17.5% 47.1%
Trondhjems Fr.(Forenedegruppen)
EqW Average -12.0% 8.5% 29.4% -20.1% -21.5% 5% -24.3% 2.2% 49.9% 16.5%
CapW Average 16.5% 6.7% 97.6% -32.7% -9.9% 3.3% -21.7% 4.0% 160.5% 1.7%
Median -16.7% 6.1% 19.6% -18.5% -18.8% 2.8% -21.7% -0.9% 36.0% 10.2%
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Table 9.15 – Stock Returns, 1981-1989
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Industry Companies
Actinor/Norgas 196.0% -73.9% 50.0% 67.6% 61.3%
Akers Mek
Borregaard 72.8% -36.3% 106.4% 69.6%
Christiania Spigerverk
D.N.L/SAS -5.0% 209.5% -32.0% 23.0% 12.2% 19.6% -20.9% 18.8% 75.8%
Dyno 1.4% -32.9% 140.8% 28.8% -77.8% -37.3% 34.0% 26.8% 24.4%
Elektrisk Bureau 73.5% -9.3% -52.9% -2.4% 5.7% 22.7% 15.4% -8.2% 18.3%
Elektrokemisk -32.1% -20.0% 250.0% -15.0% -2.7% -20.0% -39.2% 215.9% 11.8%
Follum Fabrikker 64.7% -39.1% 181.8% 59.1% -5.4%
Hafslund 3.6% 84.9% -59.1% 27.1% 62.5% -25.9% 74.0% -63.0% -34.6%
Investa 12.0% -56.1% 148.3% 125.0% 8.0% 46.3% -77.3% 5.5% 56.2%
Jonas Øglænd 86.2% 7.0% 52.2% 29.8% 55.9% 12.3% 57.1% -29.4% 20.0%
Kværner 88.9% -32.9% -52.3% 25.0% 12.9% -11.7% 18.6% 24.6% -26.1%
Norcem 51.4% -21.9% 91.7% 77.6% -42.0% -28.6%
Norema 18.5% 46.9% 85.1% 36.8% -66.1% 19.8% -42.1%
Norsk Data 517.3% 34.8% 35.4% -1.2% -59.0% -42.7% -29.8%
Norsk Hydro -24.3% -32.8% 84.2% -80.5% 50.8% -2.7% -1.7% -16.7% 42.7%
Norske Skog 40.0% -29.7% 282.4% 38.5% -27.2% 38.7% 30.2% 7.1% 38.3%
Orkla 34.0% -19.2% 123.0% 88.4% 46.4% -18.9% -2.3% 76.1% 79.4%
Saga Petroleum -49.1% 83.2% -13.1% -1.3% -30.5% 43.9% 29.9% 158.0%
Saugbrugsforeningen 28.6% -38.9% 236.4% 110.8%
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Stock Returns 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Sydvaranger -68.8% -46.7% 187.5% -13.0% -35.0% -7.7% 8.3% -23.1% -20.0%
Viking-Askim -39.4% -23.4% 300.0% -33.3% 118.8% 28.6%
Banking Companies
Bergens Bank 59.3% -20.9% 27.1% -13.2% 109.4% -6.5% -30.0% -49.3%
Bergens Kreditbank
Bergens Privatbank
Christiania Bank og Kreditkasse 10.4% -14.7% 34.5% 2.6% 14.1% 12.0% -29.0% -1.4% 45.3%
Den norske Creditbank 14.9% -11.9% 30.3% 6.5% 15.7% -3.2% -28.3% -6.8% -12.1%
Forretningsbanken 18.9% -7.4% 16.0% 1.7% 4.4% 3.2%
Shipping Companies
Atlantica 40.6% 38.8% 15.6% -50.0% 30.8% -67.6%
Beamont
Belships 56.3% -36.0% 75.0% 57.1% 13.6% -40.0% -3.3% 327.6% 77.4%
Bergehus 37.5% -27.3% 50.0% 16.7% 42.9%
Billabong 13.0% -11.5% 21.7% -7.1%
Bruusgard 23.3% -2.7% 5.6%
Det Bergenske Ds 40.0% -51.0% 200.0% 171.9%
Det Nordenfjeldske Ds -60.0% 165.3% 282.1%
Den Norske Amerikalinje -22.2% -60.0% 157.1% 33.3% 178.2% -0.6% 65.6% 56.2% 42.8%
Den Norske Afrika Og Australialinje
Ganger Rolf 117.6% -70.8% 166.7% 189.0% 68.6% -9.9% -31.7% 93.9% 228.1%
Hadrian
Ivarans Rederi 116.7% -34.6% 52.9% 23.1% 50.0% 16.7% 78.6% 66.0%
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Stock Returns 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Kosmos 3.5% -45.5% 60.3% 116.6% 101.3% -14.1% -22.7% 29.8% -31.1%
Mascot 669.4% -41.5% 4.4%
Nordheim
Pelagos
Sigmalm 70.5% -21.3% 39.0% -12.2% 52.8%
Wilhelmsens -58.8% 112.1% 21.4% 33.3% -66.9% -22.5% 161.2% 89.7%
Ørnen -40.0% 33.3% 100.0%
Insurance Companies
Storebrand 66.7% -41.3% 33.3% 18.1% 27.8% 5.0% -80.7% -19.1% 110.1%




Trondhjems Fr.(Forenedegruppen) 21.1% 349.0% 31.3% 9.8% 49.4% -32.5% 30.9%
EqW Average 48.8% -3.5% 84.4% 49.9% 27.9% -5.3% -1.7% 32.5% 43.3%
CapW Average 60.8% -19.1% 66.0% 20.8% 35.7% -3.9% -0.4% 6.7% 47.7%
Median 34.0% -29.7% 61.3% 27.9% 27.8% -3.2% -3.3% 6.3% 38.3%
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Table 9.16 – Invested Capital, 1961-1965
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Industry Companies
Actinor/Norgas
Akers Mek 466,483,200.00 474,064,400.00 574,926,300.00 806,795,500.00 1,086,177,900.00
Borregaard 303,145,401.00 359,275,454.50 315,920,186.00 436,894,834.50 1,102,469,491.00
Christiania Spigerverk 107,850,347.50 129,018,473.00 156,709,039.50 167,286,228.50 250,667,000.00
D.N.L/SAS
Dyno 25,979,562.00 24,790,324.00 25,042,231.00 29,218,865.00 73,195,148.50
Elektrisk Bureau 15,198,250.00 18,682,177.00 23,595,330.00 29,891,892.00 49,549,097.00
Elektrokemisk 178,981,661.00 178,420,783.00 174,039,015.50 182,773,691.50 299,783,995.50
Follum Fabrikker 86,565,083.50 116,365,670.50 141,019,266.00 141,768,887.00 173,490,173.00
Hafslund 78,562,572.00 85,691,588.00 82,028,164.00 89,530,825.00 163,405,585.00
Investa 396,582,518.00 444,186,769.00
Jonas Øglænd




Norsk Hydro 751,102,816.00 798,245,357.00 842,006,031.00 962,640,693.00 1,041,341,990.00
Norske Skog 115,214,109.00
Orkla 97,983,448.50 102,608,528.50 112,790,822.00 111,958,907.00 111,958,907.00
Saga Petroleum
Saugbrugsforeningen 156,894,849.00 163,786,304.00 185,318,745.00 191,185,886.00 207,761,094.50
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Invested Capital 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Sydvaranger 171,501,717.50
Viking-Askim 55,822,760.00 55,035,423.00 57,942,433.00 60,939,009.00 99,382,021.00
Banking Companies
Bergens Bank
Bergens Kreditbank 102,766,700.00 102,744,681.00 117,389,070.00 138,156,949.00 147,455,793.00
Bergens Privatbank 782,977,345.00 849,375,755.00 1,234,748,917.00 1,312,057,616.00 1,487,777,664.00
Christiania Bank og Kreditkasse 500,414,643.00 517,712,483.00 532,669,065.00 500,189,721.00 667,365,183.00
Den norske Creditbank 906,248,930.00 763,777,574.00 872,919,721.00 1,060,215,090.00 1,144,828,413.00
Forretningsbanken 69,634,109.00 67,354,054.00 135,239,603.00 153,811,399.00 176,775,041.00
Shipping Companies
Atlantica 34,126,553.00 43,045,558.00 40,273,378.00 54,398,047.00 48,176,930.00
Beamont 71,402,036.00 63,581,143.00 70,390,469.00 70,587,219.00 55,439,403.00
Belships 58,208,334.00 55,644,817.00 102,884,318.00 89,596,375.00 87,089,183.00
Bergehus 40,650,663.50 74,909,399.00 71,471,380.00 89,265,355.00
Billabong
Bruusgard 65,729,304.00 59,662,462.00 54,434,156.00 46,438,529.50 74,903,115.00
Det Bergenske Ds 266,986,265.00 271,830,873.00 261,654,852.00 235,982,316.00 218,331,199.00
Det Nordenfjeldske Ds 127,255,541.00 118,959,750.00 109,883,273.00 127,830,649.00 165,570,517.00
Den Norske Amerikalinje 113,809,628.50 123,672,516.50 137,748,308.00 158,973,308.00 166,607,749.50
Den Norske Afrika Og Australialinje 205,662,308.00 184,725,281.50 203,574,378.50 223,060,162.50 265,516,126.00
Ganger Rolf 119,111,050.00 96,866,500.00 116,707,850.00 115,051,300.00 176,935,900.00
Hadrian 5,566,050.00 5,332,762.00 4,997,161.00 4,463,677.00 69,141,070.00
Ivarans Rederi 53,513,070.50 51,536,859.00 54,734,039.00 47,437,733.50 48,863,289.50
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Invested Capital 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Kosmos 429,212,776.00 353,569,242.00 288,085,589.00 285,509,654.00 330,232,243.50
Mascot 58,420,033.50 64,765,791.50 82,728,731.00 122,618,615.00 149,733,391.00
Nordheim 67,866,797.50 79,188,419.50 90,826,503.00 115,713,632.00 144,554,893.50
Pelagos 28,506,205.00 22,626,529.00 28,591,303.00 31,049,677.00 28,747,780.00
Sigmalm 69,394,585.00
Wilhelmsens 48,293,896.50 41,331,209.00 46,622,492.00 36,528,476.50 46,710,833.50
Ørnen 110,830,156.50 92,539,791.00 124,794,932.00 142,488,053.00 127,694,084.00
Insurance Companies
Storebrand 148,984,603.00 176,458,860.00 190,003,266.00 209,042,711.00 332,142,000.00
Vesta 35,869,560.00 49,819,086.00 74,582,452.00 77,403,068.00 142,794,710.00
Arendals Forsikringsselskap 11,219,090.00 11,591,351.00 14,616,798.00 14,909,309.00 16,012,088.00
Norden, Forsikrings-Aktieselskapet 50,044,954.00 50,729,225.00 57,138,571.00 61,008,168.00 72,983,977.50
Nordengruppen
Trondhjems Fr.(Forenedegruppen)
SUM 6,810,831,626.50 6,884,471,033.50 7,832,545,255.50 9,144,258,331.50 12,069,697,199.00
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Table 9.17 – Invested Capital, 1966-1970
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Industry Companies
Actinor/Norgas 110,757,710.00
Akers Mek 969,811,600.00 1,147,369,850.00 1,406,844,450.00 1,123,687,000.00 1,138,000,000.00
Borregaard 1,101,435,343.50 975,849,121.50 997,155,778.50 937,454,122.00 1,188,976,000.00
Christiania Spigerverk 208,320,000.00 324,834,500.00 328,557,000.00 267,119,000.00 333,961,500.00
D.N.L/SAS 184,307,559.00 194,846,796.00 203,596,504.00 235,189,349.00 252,397,763.00
Dyno 74,351,471.00 88,236,918.50 131,266,200.00 154,227,500.00 187,194,500.00
Elektrisk Bureau 51,490,807.25 58,362,834.25 70,291,703.25 82,099,348.25 111,165,101.00
Elektrokemisk 380,836,622.50 322,033,000.00 424,844,500.00 488,680,500.00 625,256,500.00
Follum Fabrikker 176,848,076.50 183,785,032.50 190,653,757.50 197,950,905.00 190,990,006.00
Hafslund 158,479,195.50 152,326,509.00 160,855,014.50 179,597,242.00 215,451,466.00
Investa 425,597,554.00 466,911,303.00 572,736,116.00 619,988,488.00 1,144,348,299.00
Jonas Øglænd 88,173,270.00 84,552,084.00 89,557,902.50 94,185,314.00 94,317,534.50
Kværner 137,991,422.50 236,366,342.50 267,486,311.50 336,405,450.00 456,783,645.00
Norcem 42,317,267.00 510,040,000.00 568,601,500.00 559,202,000.00
Norema 113,490,000.00
Norsk Data
Norsk Hydro 1,062,508,341.00 1,289,072,654.50 1,337,247,000.00 1,421,034,500.00 1,412,345,000.00
Norske Skog 216,449,928.50 246,877,413.50 254,440,704.50 268,728,628.00 309,832,812.00
Orkla 109,914,002.50 135,433,180.00 154,611,799.00 154,114,677.00 90,778,117.50
Saga Petroleum
Saugbrugsforeningen 260,888,679.00 241,180,723.00 312,142,186.00 308,608,479.00 323,497,980.00
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Invested Capital 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Sydvaranger 161,932,894.00 162,481,971.50 212,484,441.50 231,940,052.00 236,457,175.50
Viking-Askim 101,454,250.50 113,184,994.50 134,254,293.00 143,398,842.50 166,794,699.00
Banking Companies
Bergens Bank
Bergens Kreditbank 143,273,821.00 142,448,150.00 149,044,855.00 181,077,403.00 198,623,545.00
Bergens Privatbank 1,746,479,873.00 1,638,856,049.00 1,557,974,464.50 1,372,641,967.00 1,292,065,504.00
Christiania Bank og Kreditkasse 661,910,068.00 832,622,780.00 1,048,157,347.00 1,172,207,961.00 1,093,872,764.00
Den norske Creditbank 1,212,385,261.00 1,303,817,190.00 1,417,466,312.00 1,795,649,856.00 1,529,084,778.00
Forretningsbanken 185,919,504.00 245,551,366.00 239,456,079.00 305,826,196.00 348,696,319.00
Shipping Companies
Atlantica 58,372,654.00 69,370,360.00 68,516,778.00 90,610,139.00 100,927,460.00
Beamont 61,288,233.00 59,871,673.00 76,219,653.00 69,980,102.00 193,497,948.00
Belships 83,978,269.00 92,233,658.00 80,976,505.00 98,693,761.00 207,113,773.00
Bergehus 103,630,202.50 141,722,919.50 124,326,030.50 155,483,335.50
Billabong
Bruusgard 84,003,619.00 73,792,538.00 62,832,430.00 46,786,194.50 46,829,545.50
Det Bergenske Ds 222,008,000.00 171,133,000.00 236,566,000.00 396,094,000.00 367,145,500.00
Det Nordenfjeldske Ds 153,535,735.00 124,152,649.00 113,926,105.00 247,955,081.00 223,743,756.00
Den Norske Amerikalinje 152,396,721.00 152,733,486.00 152,725,277.50 150,693,715.00 104,531,657.50
Den Norske Afrika Og Australialinje 423,512,168.50 403,287,084.00 499,264,121.50 593,777,090.00 806,401,399.50
Ganger Rolf 190,409,450.00 176,055,200.00 154,725,650.00 137,880,650.00 147,602,850.00
Hadrian 121,377,458.00 104,701,280.00 323,788,173.00 369,353,433.00 437,009,039.00
Ivarans Rederi 73,729,977.00 65,363,156.50 64,491,191.00 57,619,308.00 101,826,260.50
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Invested Capital 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Kosmos 312,858,890.00 423,575,580.50 471,491,636.50 475,769,985.00 616,962,173.50
Mascot 138,950,593.00 161,129,980.50 110,173,001.50 317,069,342.50 295,310,968.00
Nordheim 170,536,045.00 221,470,142.50 208,352,119.50 215,766,931.00 266,547,006.00
Pelagos 41,074,424.00 37,716,832.00 36,558,935.00 53,140,356.50 74,485,566.50
Sigmalm 68,204,713.50 95,951,523.50 85,189,321.50 324,630,328.00 626,886,570.50
Wilhelmsens 65,191,970.50 60,845,762.50 82,913,257.50 95,059,537.00 153,113,690.50
Ørnen 177,959,523.00 187,295,860.00 182,792,042.00 156,323,067.00 216,509,579.00
Insurance Companies
Storebrand 325,240,000.00 363,472,000.00 454,814,000.00 479,213,000.00 570,407,500.00
Vesta 122,018,771.00 144,415,113.00 153,062,245.00 170,277,000.00 212,752,000.00
Arendals Forsikringsselskap 16,271,500.00 17,672,217.00 18,709,747.00 24,753,623.00 42,910,164.00
Norden, Forsikrings-Aktieselskapet 74,111,977.00 82,998,801.00 95,636,854.50 99,925,891.00 85,608,591.00
Nordengruppen
Trondhjems Fr.(Forenedegruppen)
SUM 13,061,420,438.25 14,060,278,846.75 15,904,889,763.25 17,436,112,844.75 19,777,947,052.00
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Table 9.18 – Invested Capital, 1971-1975
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Industry Companies
Actinor/Norgas 96,631,171.00 96,631,171.00 150,107,000.00 194,996,000.00 220,907,000.00
Akers Mek 1,182,800,000.00 1,241,550,000.00 1,333,700,000.00 1,698,750,000.00 1,638,350,000.00
Borregaard 1,308,919,500.00 1,442,031,500.00 1,502,901,500.00 1,223,394,500.00 1,454,009,500.00
Christiania Spigerverk 464,642,500.00
D.N.L/SAS 283,138,361.00 283,739,568.00 297,972,617.00 298,137,507.00 300,222,385.00
Dyno 204,295,500.00 261,044,500.00 296,633,000.00 337,844,500.00 399,764,000.00
Elektrisk Bureau 155,482,561.25 168,080,048.25 152,278,721.00 188,016,750.00 234,629,750.00
Elektrokemisk 792,993,500.00 1,454,106,000.00 1,509,279,500.00 1,710,577,000.00 1,929,089,500.00
Follum Fabrikker 199,362,987.00 182,470,799.50 172,889,671.50 168,680,904.50 251,074,022.00
Hafslund 227,706,096.00 229,214,055.50 225,756,456.50 269,962,015.00 306,778,525.50
Investa 1,203,871,500.00 1,251,259,500.00 1,502,930,500.00 1,588,596,000.00 1,768,596,000.00
Jonas Øglænd 111,997,448.00 148,633,078.50 171,041,332.00 215,486,129.50 203,942,191.00
Kværner 577,591,200.00 568,019,000.00 780,044,000.00 987,736,500.00 1,604,016,000.00
Norcem 620,757,500.00 668,603,000.00 729,431,500.00 710,950,000.00 684,446,500.00
Norema 132,003,500.00 173,698,500.00 207,405,500.00 160,292,500.00
Norsk Data 9,501,000.00 11,814,000.00
Norsk Hydro 1,518,590,500.00 1,657,780,500.00 1,953,527,500.00 3,204,179,000.00 4,634,147,500.00
Norske Skog 382,800,000.00 509,347,500.00 501,259,000.00 547,859,000.00 644,247,500.00
Orkla 145,347,000.00 152,638,500.00 176,405,000.00 227,154,500.00 256,987,000.00
Saga Petroleum 20,671,965.50 - 76,860,354.50 - 199,007,267.50
Saugbrugsforeningen 328,901,456.00 303,579,396.00 290,923,286.00 326,105,906.00 419,257,320.00
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Invested Capital 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Sydvaranger 250,871,500.00 238,969,500.00 362,851,000.00 560,578,500.00 668,179,500.00
Viking-Askim 185,787,326.00 225,958,494.50 196,434,038.00 284,822,707.50 278,021,713.00
Banking Companies
Bergens Bank 2,182,121,902.00
Bergens Kreditbank 230,011,472.00 289,885,299.00 324,528,528.00 289,885,299.00
Bergens Privatbank 1,295,808,559.50 1,718,515,095.50
Christiania Bank og Kreditkasse 1,051,526,634.00 1,417,686,318.00 1,621,128,354.50 1,658,006,847.50 1,272,366,813.00
Den norske Creditbank 1,554,008,268.00 1,976,756,103.00 1,948,978,976.00 1,922,870,295.00 2,106,050,994.00
Forretningsbanken 418,042,283.00 453,260,966.00 471,628,201.00 652,607,116.00 704,822,962.00
Shipping Companies
Atlantica 95,041,588.00 72,157,771.00 129,037,786.00 317,011,356.50 398,442,371.50
Beamont 187,512,859.00 278,887,316.00 374,500,532.00 382,822,081.50 145,402,890.00
Belships 230,200,257.00 289,048,804.00 500,552,349.00 504,653,256.00 310,993,153.00
Bergehus 152,616,753.00 161,695,466.00 217,083,300.00 179,187,571.00 193,598,938.00
Billabong 132,728,072.50 126,054,918.50 114,025,725.00 194,303,443.00 394,690,447.00
Bruusgard 162,675,468.00 116,397,084.50 144,309,130.50 115,570,999.00 89,435,075.00
Det Bergenske Ds 347,699,500.00 329,534,000.00 331,636,000.00 309,954,000.00 285,093,000.00
Det Nordenfjeldske Ds 259,243,640.00 299,938,965.00 358,762,872.00 388,165,021.00 362,922,673.00
Den Norske Amerikalinje 210,470,631.50 254,633,946.50 302,133,547.00 278,861,500.00 402,113,500.00
Den Norske Afrika Og Australialinje 709,908,441.00 695,639,213.00 949,187,307.00 1,152,086,913.00 1,083,814,265.00
Ganger Rolf 147,133,350.00 139,959,950.00 141,171,850.00 151,598,700.00 244,072,350.00
Hadrian 393,282,873.00 681,677,560.00 634,217,378.00 596,176,074.00 591,344,088.00
Ivarans Rederi 94,207,185.00 87,236,219.50 98,602,119.00 91,064,476.00 80,282,298.00
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Invested Capital 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Kosmos 717,509,365.00 710,541,826.00 870,394,273.00 778,132,151.00 736,762,890.00
Mascot 276,486,496.00 367,794,825.50 626,247,758.50 533,289,727.00 483,985,108.00
Nordheim 247,718,046.00 296,298,061.50 602,864,622.00 532,449,032.00 456,061,284.50
Pelagos 62,086,460.50 38,820,502.50 112,651,450.50 106,206,165.50 99,679,711.50
Sigmalm 605,958,683.00 587,893,954.50 462,029,485.50 388,950,849.00 405,993,405.00
Wilhelmsens 131,289,505.00 131,882,607.50 206,272,832.50 259,280,781.00 234,279,941.00
Ørnen 251,022,673.00 198,092,833.00 308,638,846.00 282,281,076.00 204,456,317.00
Insurance Companies
Storebrand 665,556,000.00 559,047,000.00 518,723,000.00 501,383,000.00 559,676,000.00
Vesta 244,095,000.00 264,885,000.00 288,325,000.00 329,981,000.00 347,615,000.00
Arendals Forsikringsselskap 75,866,825.00 120,093,000.00 188,204,000.00 236,193,000.00
Norden, Forsikrings-Aktieselskapet
Nordengruppen 212,985,055.00 254,848,620.00 275,373,000.00 309,007,000.00 412,445,000.00
Trondhjems Fr.(Forenedegruppen)
SUM 21,537,183,049.25 22,284,304,241.75 27,340,459,406.00 27,629,727,271.00 32,658,287,515.50
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Table 9.19 – Invested Capital, 1976-1980
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Industry Companies
Actinor/Norgas 258,827,500.00 351,855,000.00 401,319,000.00 499,414,000.00 404,327,500.00
Akers Mek 1,367,650,000.00 1,189,650,000.00 1,278,450,000.00 1,327,400,000.00 613,600,000.00
Borregaard 2,209,666,500.00 2,456,760,500.00 2,518,849,000.00 1,614,534,000.00 1,474,291,500.00
Christiania Spigerverk
D.N.L/SAS 293,749,993.00 308,794,500.00 558,564,000.00 843,754,000.00 936,513,000.00
Dyno 531,974,000.00 626,215,500.00 753,938,500.00 726,423,500.00 755,532,500.00
Elektrisk Bureau 307,406,750.00 431,055,500.00 480,821,750.00 503,776,000.00 608,875,000.00
Elektrokemisk 2,329,433,500.00 2,251,550,000.00 2,288,100,000.00 2,748,750,000.00 2,454,700,000.00
Follum Fabrikker 258,388,948.50 275,955,500.00 298,822,500.00 323,047,000.00 411,958,500.00
Hafslund 421,698,000.00 487,564,000.00 522,447,500.00 522,090,500.00 532,485,500.00
Investa 1,826,222,000.00 1,977,664,500.00 2,155,009,000.00 2,294,312,000.00 820,547,000.00
Jonas Øglænd 151,397,500.00 171,109,500.00 173,265,000.00 198,840,500.00 231,383,000.00
Kværner 1,506,786,500.00 1,650,062,000.00 2,033,457,500.00 1,497,778,000.00 1,793,117,000.00
Norcem 914,524,000.00 1,027,119,000.00 1,415,391,500.00 1,571,610,500.00 1,571,600,000.00
Norema 161,874,000.00 149,610,500.00 155,463,000.00 174,435,000.00 183,407,500.00
Norsk Data 27,708,500.00 34,198,500.00 74,988,500.00 188,360,500.00 145,071,000.00
Norsk Hydro 7,898,501,500.00 10,056,000,000.00 11,947,500,000.00 13,537,000,000.00 13,389,500,000.00
Norske Skog 659,184,000.00 753,415,500.00 653,489,000.00 796,458,500.00 834,677,000.00
Orkla 291,218,500.00 216,699,500.00 235,651,500.00 302,755,000.00 443,446,500.00
Saga Petroleum - 305,776,238.00 - 235,379,000.00 - 163,805,000.00 582,837,000.00 804,098,000.00
Saugbrugsforeningen 460,099,448.00 368,967,000.00 499,350,500.00
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Invested Capital 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Sydvaranger 601,237,000.00 688,989,500.00 909,379,000.00 1,107,796,000.00 1,542,791,000.00
Viking-Askim 225,588,171.00 238,857,500.00 220,158,500.00 266,307,500.00 257,902,500.00
Banking Companies
Bergens Bank 2,294,762,595.50 3,052,300,000.00 2,088,926,000.00 3,655,878,000.00 4,685,730,000.00
Bergens Kreditbank
Bergens Privatbank
Christiania Bank og Kreditkasse 1,417,162,316.00 2,730,410,000.00 1,944,015,500.00 1,748,124,500.00 4,115,624,000.00
Den norske Creditbank 2,277,824,932.00 2,729,733,000.00 2,308,880,000.00 2,810,033,500.00
Forretningsbanken 542,334,865.00 717,225,000.00 760,946,500.00 550,893,000.00
Shipping Companies
Atlantica 399,770,252.50 400,947,500.00 382,910,000.00 345,009,500.00 503,062,000.00
Beamont 141,698,765.00 127,042,500.00 118,973,500.00 96,621,500.00 79,737,000.00
Belships 241,360,371.00 206,414,000.00 160,050,000.00 117,978,000.00 103,407,000.00
Bergehus 197,253,561.50 185,824,500.00 190,560,500.00 263,894,500.00
Billabong 355,100,143.50 346,610,000.00 292,032,000.00 231,719,000.00 410,207,000.00
Bruusgard 77,115,025.00 81,250,000.00 84,092,500.00 81,998,000.00 133,260,000.00
Det Bergenske Ds 269,386,000.00 272,393,500.00 257,401,000.00 615,242,500.00 994,502,000.00
Det Nordenfjeldske Ds 362,502,366.00 463,348,000.00 428,864,000.00 473,840,500.00 488,806,000.00
Den Norske Amerikalinje 346,745,500.00 335,555,500.00 281,857,500.00 283,409,500.00 191,268,500.00
Den Norske Afrika Og Australialinje 1,070,480,647.00 1,246,635,500.00 1,048,941,000.00 918,891,000.00 1,033,611,500.00
Ganger Rolf 237,901,000.00 180,916,000.00 145,740,500.00 145,782,000.00 203,306,500.00
Hadrian 611,100,164.00 490,719,500.00 311,368,000.00 284,915,000.00
Ivarans Rederi 171,120,452.00 147,339,500.00 158,007,000.00 140,593,500.00 146,999,500.00
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Invested Capital 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Kosmos 644,591,638.00 679,544,000.00 667,960,000.00 1,553,856,000.00 2,183,025,000.00
Mascot 449,630,222.00 319,300,500.00 169,360,000.00 141,970,000.00 312,933,000.00
Nordheim 353,854,514.50 203,619,000.00
Pelagos 27,293,191.00 391,474,500.00 488,800,000.00 444,515,500.00
Sigmalm 410,539,159.00 372,302,500.00 364,250,000.00 442,567,500.00
Wilhelmsens 233,558,834.00 262,531,000.00 221,695,000.00 194,337,000.00 217,276,000.00
Ørnen 181,922,695.00 160,233,000.00 142,022,000.00 116,406,000.00
Insurance Companies
Storebrand 1,515,958,500.00 1,815,826,000.00 1,740,951,500.00 1,594,601,000.00 1,759,761,000.00
Vesta 368,267,415.00 362,318,000.00 602,825,000.00 561,225,000.00 624,831,000.00
Arendals Forsikringsselskap
Norden, Forsikrings-Aktieselskapet
Nordengruppen 441,511,000.00 533,057,000.00 517,870,000.00 596,204,000.00
Trondhjems Fr.(Forenedegruppen)
SUM 38,038,106,197.00 44,291,584,000.00 45,289,909,250.00 49,215,317,000.00 49,220,039,000.00
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Table 9.20 – Invested Capital, 1981-1985
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Industry Companies
Actinor/Norgas 687,496,500.00 1,002,853,500.00 1,044,320,500.00 1,072,769,000.00 1,179,069,000.00
Akers Mek 578,650,000.00 878,600,000.00 623,800,000.00 808,600,000.00 1,055,450,000.00
Borregaard 1,800,448,000.00 1,891,421,000.00 1,963,590,000.00 2,095,527,000.00 2,024,350,000.00
Christiania Spigerverk
D.N.L/SAS 1,099,075,500.00 1,102,963,000.00 992,268,000.00 1,407,800,000.00 1,608,200,000.00
Dyno 890,228,000.00 874,106,000.00 911,018,000.00 1,463,053,500.00 2,231,550,000.00
Elektrisk Bureau 683,718,500.00 893,408,000.00 1,100,344,500.00 1,236,733,000.00 1,275,646,000.00
Elektrokemisk 3,323,600,000.00 3,084,550,000.00 1,779,970,000.00 5,141,500,000.00 4,804,500,000.00
Follum Fabrikker 530,912,000.00 537,295,000.00 611,672,000.00 592,456,000.00 577,325,000.00
Hafslund 546,762,500.00 810,439,000.00 1,030,140,500.00 1,245,526,500.00 2,847,561,500.00
Investa 1,219,304,000.00 1,048,890,500.00 1,042,572,500.00 1,039,729,000.00 2,086,922,500.00
Jonas Øglænd 237,950,500.00 229,006,500.00 248,172,000.00 247,183,000.00 242,756,500.00
Kværner 2,044,313,500.00 2,543,689,000.00 3,402,550,500.00 2,943,091,500.00 2,758,340,500.00
Norcem 1,714,500,500.00 1,321,037,500.00 1,748,145,000.00 2,351,619,500.00 3,034,500,000.00
Norema 202,790,800.00 191,292,000.00 224,610,500.00 275,707,500.00 276,739,500.00
Norsk Data 221,031,500.00 352,015,000.00 703,328,500.00 1,474,050,000.00 1,684,700,000.00
Norsk Hydro 9,640,000,000.00 13,138,000,000.00 16,480,500,000.00 17,863,000,000.00 20,565,500,000.00
Norske Skog 959,935,000.00 1,020,246,500.00 1,113,551,000.00 1,215,729,500.00 1,422,592,500.00
Orkla 569,246,000.00 732,893,500.00 815,957,000.00 1,284,409,000.00 5,908,350,000.00
Saga Petroleum 1,069,561,000.00 2,398,598,000.00 3,626,819,000.00 4,056,050,000.00 6,079,400,000.00
Saugbrugsforeningen
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Invested Capital 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Sydvaranger 600,913,500.00 725,220,000.00 533,683,000.00 392,988,500.00 398,119,500.00
Viking-Askim 303,914,000.00 307,172,500.00 271,541,500.00 140,986,000.00 106,558,500.00
Banking Companies
Bergens Bank 4,711,765,000.00 5,558,092,000.00 5,993,586,000.00 14,895,050,000.00 20,614,050,000.00
Bergens Kreditbank
Bergens Privatbank




Atlantica 891,648,000.00 1,629,882,500.00 1,510,435,500.00 1,380,781,500.00 1,262,994,000.00
Beamont
Belships 105,164,000.00 96,116,000.00 120,789,000.00 194,576,000.00 78,161,500.00
Bergehus 538,177,500.00 579,731,500.00 551,911,000.00 460,677,000.00
Billabong 361,470,000.00 368,945,500.00 347,464,500.00 314,973,000.00
Bruusgard 180,865,000.00 167,459,000.00 99,648,500.00
Det Bergenske Ds 1,392,359,500.00 900,151,000.00 869,771,000.00 564,600,000.00
Det Nordenfjeldske Ds 990,974,000.00 862,217,500.00 889,391,000.00 711,398,000.00
Den Norske Amerikalinje 112,497,000.00 30,174,000.00 31,550,000.00 23,078,000.00 137,613,000.00
Den Norske Afrika Og Australialinje
Ganger Rolf 225,406,000.00 187,619,000.00 165,412,500.00 240,230,500.00 743,839,500.00
Hadrian
Ivarans Rederi 201,343,500.00 247,699,500.00 239,195,500.00 265,208,000.00 279,096,000.00
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Invested Capital 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Kosmos 2,371,268,000.00 2,025,042,000.00 2,644,791,000.00 2,926,243,000.00 4,583,602,500.00
Mascot 331,890,500.00 349,885,000.00 331,127,000.00 483,261,500.00
Nordheim
Pelagos
Sigmalm 911,210,500.00 1,008,384,500.00 1,129,505,500.00 1,085,593,500.00
Wilhelmsens 2,960,413,500.00 4,255,826,000.00 4,406,644,500.00 5,330,622,000.00 6,305,861,000.00
Ørnen 114,897,000.00 97,903,000.00 90,792,000.00 100,859,000.00
Insurance Companies
Storebrand 1,978,736,000.00 2,528,616,000.00 2,774,113,000.00 3,107,641,000.00 1,734,200,000.00




Trondhjems Fr.(Forenedegruppen) 30,124,000.00 34,138,000.00 39,188,000.00 236,156,000.00
SUM 54,558,937,300.00 65,752,560,500.00 79,754,641,000.00 104,391,201,000.00 138,081,470,000.00
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Table 9.21 – Invested Capital, 1986-1989
1986 1987 1988 1989
Industry Companies
Actinor/Norgas
Akers Mek 1,498,050,000.00 4,817,800,000.00 7,803,800,000.00
Borregaard
Christiania Spigerverk
D.N.L/SAS 2,361,650,000.00 2,929,350,000.00 4,474,000,000.00 5,833,000,000.00
Dyno 2,895,200,000.00 3,410,350,000.00 3,939,700,000.00 3,962,300,000.00
Elektrisk Bureau 2,002,172,500.00 2,935,453,000.00 3,917,379,000.00 3,807,792,500.00
Elektrokemisk 5,250,500,000.00 5,194,500,000.00 6,302,500,000.00 6,706,000,000.00
Follum Fabrikker 619,912,000.00 880,000,000.00 944,000,000.00
Hafslund 2,558,500,000.00 2,855,850,000.00 3,746,950,000.00 3,817,500,000.00
Investa 2,189,939,500.00 1,871,144,000.00 3,424,010,000.00 5,140,206,500.00
Jonas Øglænd 326,418,000.00 416,573,000.00 394,912,500.00
Kværner 3,273,975,500.00 3,771,484,000.00 3,568,000,000.00 4,874,500,000.00
Norcem 4,698,500,000.00
Norema 390,333,500.00 389,463,500.00
Norsk Data 2,627,250,000.00 4,263,500,000.00 3,717,500,000.00 2,147,500,000.00
Norsk Hydro 28,660,500,000.00 28,606,000,000.00 45,025,000,000.00 46,483,500,000.00
Norske Skog 1,787,566,000.00 2,650,950,000.00 3,082,400,000.00 6,827,000,000.00
Orkla 5,125,350,000.00 5,911,100,000.00 5,817,200,000.00 7,176,000,000.00
Saga Petroleum 7,624,600,000.00 8,330,750,000.00 9,531,300,000.00 10,041,100,000.00
Saugbrugsforeningen
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Invested Capital 1986 1987 1988 1989
Sydvaranger 412,238,000.00 573,693,000.00 572,353,500.00 534,779,500.00
Viking-Askim 127,447,000.00 143,024,000.00 106,531,500.00
Banking Companies
Bergens Bank 17,457,500,000.00 18,191,250,000.00 22,545,866,500.00 27,647,950,000.00
Bergens Kreditbank
Bergens Privatbank
Christiania Bank og Kreditkasse 57,728,049,000.00 61,764,540,000.00 22,661,550,000.00 24,971,450,000.00











Den Norske Amerikalinje 43,461,000.00 781,788,500.00 850,591,000.00 1,067,411,500.00
Den Norske Afrika Og Australialinje
Ganger Rolf 675,275,500.00 622,981,000.00 729,757,500.00
Hadrian
Ivarans Rederi 248,467,500.00 525,309,500.00 376,235,000.00
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Invested Capital 1986 1987 1988 1989





Wilhelmsens 3,686,646,500.00 3,203,482,500.00 2,971,986,500.00 3,435,163,000.00
Ørnen
Insurance Companies
Storebrand 2,117,400,000.00 4,719,450,000.00 5,862,200,000.00 4,920,500,000.00




Trondhjems Fr.(Forenedegruppen) 176,988,000.00 233,062,000.00 402,260,000.00 423,848,000.00
SUM 190,570,440,500.00 202,417,686,500.00 191,997,870,500.00 270,788,649,000.00
115
Table 9.22 – Return on Equity, 1961-1970.
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Industry 11.5% 9.0% 7.7% 8.2% 9.9% 8.6% 10.0% 9.9% 11.5% 13.5%
Banking 10.4% 8.3% 5.7% 5.4% 5.6% 5.9% 5.0% 6.6% 7.6% 9.9%
Shipping 12.4% 6.3% 11.4% 11.7% 12.8% 12.0% 15.7% 17.1% 17.7% 26.0%
Insurance 10.5% 5.4% 5.8% 6.3% 4.7% 8.6% 5.6% 14.3% 5.2% 5.7%
TOTAL 11.5% 7.9% 8.0% 8.3% 9.3% 8.7% 9.9% 10.8% 11.6% 15.6%
Table 9.23 – Return on Equity, 1971-1980. 1) No observations available
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Industry 6.7% 3.2% 7.9% 10.5% 8.6% 11.9% 6.5% 4.2% 4.1% 14.2%
Banking 8.3% 6.1% 8.0% 7.7% 8.4% 11.2% 15.5% 7.2% 9.6% 0.0%1
Shipping 21.7% 25.9% 31.6% 15.7% 2.5% 8.1% 8.8% 8.9% 16.9% 25.0%
Insurance 5.9% 11.3% 11.1% 14.3% 14.0% 12.0% 9.6% 16.6% 16.2% 12.6%
TOTAL 10.0% 8.7% 11.6% 11.3% 8.1% 11.3% 8.8% 5.8% 6.0% 13.8%
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Table 9.24 – Return on Equity, 1981-1989. 2) No observations available
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Industry 13.9% 8.2% 11.6% 14.0% 13.0% 4.2% 13.4% 21.2% 16.2%
Banking 0.0%2 21.7% 30.8% 36.3% 28.3% 27.3% -12.7% -8.4% 11.0%
Shipping 11.9% 16.8% 11.9% 19.8% 9.7% -25.9% -6.7% -10.4% 26.3%
Insurance 13.3% 9.4% 17.5% 7.9% 9.5% 13.8% -28.6% -24.7% -6.7%
TOTAL 12.3% 9.9% 12.8% 15.2% 14.0% 7.1% 5.4% 14.4% 15.5%
Table 9.25 – Debt Ratio, 1961-1970. Based on equally-weighted averages.
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Industry 41% 45% 45% 53% 62% 61% 62% 61% 60% 62%
Banking 84% 83% 74% 76% 76% 75% 76% 75% 82% 79%
Shipping 67% 67% 71% 71% 74% 78% 77% 74% 76% 79%
Insurance 43% 45% 41% 43% 43% 41% 41% 41% 46% 47%
TOTAL 58% 60% 60% 63% 67% 68% 68% 66% 68% 69%
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Table 9.26 – Debt Ratio, 1971-1980. Based on equally-weighted averages.
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Industry 62% 63% 63% 60% 65% 65% 62% 63% 63% 63%
Banking 78% 80% 81% 81% 77% 73% 77% 70% 70% 82%
Shipping 80% 77% 78% 78% 80% 79% 82% 82% 82% 82%
Insurance 56% 69% 69% 71% 66% 74% 76% 81% 75% 68%
TOTAL 71% 71% 71% 70% 72% 72% 72% 72% 70% 71%
Table 9.27 – Debt Ratio, 1981-1989. Based on equally-weighted averages.
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Industry 61% 66% 60% 56% 55% 59% 62% 61% 60%
Banking 86% 85% 85% 90% 92% 89% 88% 88% 57%
Shipping 85% 82% 79% 64% 72% 60% 65% 66% 57%
Insurancee 67% 44% 45% 44% 46% 48% 64% 56% 48%
TOTAL 71% 71% 67% 60% 61% 61% 65% 64% 58%
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Table 9.28 – Market Value, 1961-1965
Market Cap 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Industry 1,291,784,932.50 801,091,800.00 1,275,517,100.00 1,312,794,675.50 1,324,253,678.80
Banking 317,550,000.00 310,350,000.00 400,325,000.00 414,770,000.00 454,725,000.00
Shipping 516,704,750.00 431,233,250.00 464,435,150.00 451,403,375.00 462,841,850.00
Insurance 107,462,500.00 120,112,750.00 164,823,750.00 168,274,625.00 182,061,625.00
TOTAL 2,233,502,182.50 1,662,787,800.00 2,305,101,000.00 2,347,242,675.50 2,423,882,153.80
Table 9.29 – Market Value, 1966-1970
Market Cap 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Industry 1,499,359,974.00 1,533,810,826.00 2,449,052,447.50 3,005,565,905.00 3,724,454,152.50
Banking 471,920,000.00 451,020,000.00 534,025,000.00 621,290,000.00 646,030,000.00
Shipping 442,978,050.00 475,290,200.00 575,833,675.00 739,892,550.00 1,475,413,750.00
Insurance 156,106,625.00 174,570,000.00 266,111,750.00 320,784,750.00 438,717,000.00
TOTAL 2,570,364,649.00 2,634,691,026.00 3,825,022,872.50 4,687,533,205.00 6,284,614,902.50
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Table 9.30 – Market Value, 1971-1975
Market Cap 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Industry 4,090,681,240.00 4,901,536,024.00 10,146,751,123.00 5,593,952,405.00 5,382,442,140.00
Banking 738,590,000.00 855,735,000.00 996,625,000.00 667,540,000.00 1,029,350,000.00
Shipping 1,385,265,000.00 1,640,009,450.00 2,105,752,100.00 1,332,862,000.00 932,926,000.00
Insurance 364,919,000.00 443,856,500.00 479,571,000.00 400,819,500.00 336,107,100.00
TOTAL 6,579,455,240.00 7,841,136,974.00 13,728,699,223.00 7,995,173,905.00 7,680,825,240.00
Table 9.31 – Market Value, 1976-1980
Market Cap 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Industry 5,489,078,240.00 3,969,971,555.00 4,122,047,145.00 11,535,599,364.00 12,060,854,226.00
Banking 1,236,520,000.00 1,372,120,000.00 1,406,880,000.00 1,549,470,000.00 558,000,000.00
Shipping 1,089,390,000.00 755,869,400.00 649,333,500.00 1,038,550,000.00 1,082,744,500.00
Insurance 354,022,000.00 255,422,400.00 242,505,000.00 422,164,000.00 535,500,000.00
TOTAL 8,169,010,240.00 6,353,383,355.00 6,420,765,645.00 14,545,783,364.00 14,237,098,726.00
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Table 9.32 – Market Value, 1981-1985
Market Cap 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Industry 11,992,080,896.00 9,488,963,643.00 22,201,733,753.50 28,597,026,040.50 33,474,720,589.50
Banking 642,625,000.00 685,062,500.00 1,231,200,000.00 1,544,584,080.00 4,669,477,166.00
Shipping 1,894,156,000.00 1,081,185,050.00 2,085,307,500.00 4,388,422,191.00 4,608,442,934.50
Insurance 918,750,000.00 915,450,000.00 1,362,421,940.00 2,704,478,280.00 3,138,281,616.00
TOTAL 15,447,611,896.00 12,170,661,193.00 26,880,663,193.50 37,234,510,591.50 45,890,922,306.00
Table 9.33 – Market Value, 1986-1989
Market Cap 1986 1987 1988 1989
Industry 31,035,264,843.00 31,649,191,596.00 47,694,891,240.00 66,119,337,695.00
Banking 8,136,028,935.00 6,464,345,916.00 5,225,855,852.00 6,699,643,183.00
Shipping 2,878,515,556.25 2,386,550,281.00 3,860,300,519.50 6,058,768,181.40
Insurance 3,216,643,670.00 3,128,772,345.00 2,713,203,350.00 3,654,628,200.00
TOTAL 45,266,453,004.25 43,628,860,138.00 59,494,250,961.50 82,532,377,259.40
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Table 9.34 – Number of Sorted Companies, 1961-1970
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Industry 12 12 13 13 13 14 16 19 19 19
Shipping 17 18 18 18 19 19 19 19 19 18
Insurance 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Banking 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Total 37 38 40 40 41 42 44 47 47 46
Table 9.35 – Number of Sorted Companies, 1971-1980
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Industry 21 21 20 21 21 21 21 21 22 22
Shipping 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 19 18 16
Insurance 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 2
Banking 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 1
Total 49 50 49 50 49 48 48 47 47 41
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Table 9.36 – Number of Sorted Companies, 1981-1989
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Industry 22 22 22 22 18 16 15 14 14
Shipping 14 14 14 13 9 7 6 6 5
Insurance 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2
Banking 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3
Total 39 40 40 39 32 29 27 26 24
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